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 Abstract 
 
The fact that destination countries in contemporary migration are predominantly welfare 
states marks a distinct departure from historical patterns. While the impact of 
international migration on the welfare state is highly contested in the literature, the other 
side of the relationship—the ways in which advanced welfare states influence the 
incorporation of immigrants—has barely been examined. This study tests the 
applicability of an extension of the Welfare Regime Theory in the incorporation of 
foreign-born as compared to natives across 24 European nations clustered in 5 different 
welfare regimes. Specifically, it explores how much of the variability in self-reported 
economic and social capital indicators of incorporation is attributable to the nature of the 
welfare state and to specific theoretical traits associated with different welfare regimes. 
Results indicate that immigrants fare economically better in countries with 
comprenhensive welfare systems of social protection and that country’s amount of social 
spending has a positive influence in the economic incorporation of foreign-labor. The 
impact of the welfare state on individuals’ economic well-being is higher for the native-
born population than for their immigrant counterparts. Generous welfare systems are also 
benefitial for the social capital formation of immigrant communities. Immigrants residing 
in countries representative of the Scandinavian regime report higher levels of generalized 
trust, trust in institutions and frequency of informal social contacts than immigrants 
residing in countries representative of other welfare regimes. The same pattern is 
observed for the native-born population. Country’s spending in social benefits increases 
the social trust and frequency of socialization of both groups, although the impact is 
larger for the native-born population. Country’s spending in means-tested social benefits 
decreases social trust while country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits increases it. 
Native-born individuals report higher levels of generalized trust and socialize more often 
than equivalent immigrants. However, the level of trust in country’s institutions is higher 
for immigrant than for their native peers.  
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Chapter One 
 
Immigration and immigrant incorporation are salient issues. With an estimate of 
200 million migrants worldwide (IOM, 2009), understanding the mechanisms behind 
their incorporation into host societies is not only an important theoretical issue but also a 
pressing political matter.  
Hosting an estimated 10 per cent of international immigrants and with an annual 
rate of migrant stock of 2 per cent, Europe is no exception to this global trend (UN, 
2009).  
European countries never conceived of immigration as a permanent phenomenon. 
However, a large share of guest workers, who participated in the reconstruction of 
Europe after World War II, decided to establish residency when Europe closed its borders 
to international migration during the oil crisis of the 1970’s.  Although Europe is not 
novel to the immigration phenomenon; unlike earlier periods of migration, contemporary 
destination countries are predominantly welfare states. Moreover, recipient European 
countries have made immigrants’ access to society’s welfare benefits a preferred strategy 
for their incorporation (Guiraudon, 1998; 2000; Jacobson, 1996; Soysal, 1994).  
The impact that international migration exerts on the welfare state is a highly 
contested topic in the literature, particularly as to whether international labor represents a 
threat for the sustainability of advanced welfare states (Eger, 2009; Rhodes, 1998; 
Stephens, Huber & Ray, 1999). Unexpectedly, scholarly research examining the impact 
of the welfare state on the economic and social incorporation of immigrants is sparse in 
comparison. More specifically, only a handful of systematic studies, which disentangle 
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the role of the welfare state from the impact of individual-level traits have been 
conducted on the economic incorporation of immigrants. In addition, no study with those 
characteristics has been performed that explores the dimension of immigrants’ social 
incorporation. There are several reasons that may have contributed to this lack of 
research: the extent of the topic and its interdisciplinary nature, the disagreement among 
scholars regarding the notions of welfare state and immigrant incorporation and the little 
theoretical understanding of how the welfare and incorporation mechanisms interrelate. 
Yet given the relevance of the welfare state as an agent of incorporation, it is very 
important to understand how the welfare state relates to the incorporation of immigrants 
in order to design effective measures of incorporation that foster the social cohesion of 
recipient societies. 
This study contributes to this lacuna in the literature by exploring the influence 
wielded by advanced welfare states in the economic well-being and social capital of 
immigrants as compared to native-born. Without resting merits to the role of individual-
level characteristics on immigrants’ incorporation variability, this study focuses on the 
influence of host countries’ welfare systems. More specifically, this study tests the 
applicability of the Welfare Regime Theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990) on the economic 
and social incorporation of foreign-born individuals across 24 European nations clustered 
in 5 welfare state regimes: Scandinavian, Bismarckian, Anglo-Saxon, Southern, and 
Eastern.  
Welfare regimes are considered ideal types. Some countries are “hybrids” that 
possess characteristics of more than one regime. Others do not correspond perfectly to the 
theoretical traits proposed by the theory. Therefore, in a second step of the analysis, this 
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study substitutes the welfare regimes predictor for constitutive traits of the welfare state 
such as welfare effort (social spending) and welfare scope (social spending in means-
tested versus no means-tested social benefits).  
Prior literature on the influence of the welfare state on the economic incorporation 
of immigrants has mainly revolved around the labor market (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 
2007; Kogan, 2007; Wanner & Dronkers, 2005). While there is not doubt that 
performance variability in the job market contributes to immigrants’ economic 
incorporation, it also can be misleading if it is understood as the only criterion. Foreign-
born, particularly if moving from countries less economically advanced than the 
destination societies are in a more vulnerable position to compete in the host labor 
markets than are their native counterparts. To adequately gauge the influence of the 
welfare state on the economic incorporation of immigrants, it is necessary to account for 
the ability of the host countries’ welfare structures to compensate for immigrants’ 
economic disadvantages when settling in a new country.  This study addresses prior 
limitations by looking at foreign-born self-reported variability to live on their income 
across welfare regimes, independently of market participation.  
Research establishes that societies with higher levels of social capital have better 
democratic institutions, stronger economies, and less crime and corruption. Additionally, 
the citizens of these societies participate more actively in civic organizations and are 
more tolerant toward people different from themselves (Delhey & Newton 2005; Guiso, 
Sapienza & Zingales, 2004; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). In a word, societies with 
higher levels of social capital are more cohesive and function better. It is thus not 
surprising that a major interest in current social science research is to understand how 
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social capital is generated. Until very recently the focus of social capital research has 
concentrated almost exclusively on individual-level characteristics. However, the role of 
the welfare state in the generation of social capital has seldom been studied, and no cross-
national research has been done on the impact of different welfare states on the social 
capital accumulation of foreign-born populations as compared to native-born.  
Cross-national past literature also presents a number of methodological 
constraints, which are mainly derived from the data sources available. Some previous 
research limitations have been: the incompatibility of cross-national data sources, a 
reduced number of countries and a limited number of immigrant groups. This study 
attempts to overcome prior data incompatibility limitations by employing a data source, 
the European Social Survey (ESS), specifically designed to assure dependable 
comparisons across European countries.  
To answer the aforementioned questions, the outline of this study proceeds as 
follows:  
Chapter 2 lays the theoretical foundation. It develops a conceptual framework that 
traces the expansion of the welfare state from an inward-system oriented to serve citizens 
only, to countries’ mechanism of immigrant incorporation. In a second part of the chapter 
the constructs of welfare state and immigrant incorporation are defined. Additionally, the 
last section of the second chapter is devoted to explaining how the welfare state operates 
to facilitate the economic and social incorporation of immigrants.  
Chapter 3 reviews prior empirical literature conducted to test the theoretical 
framework developed in the second chapter. This chapter is devoted to summarize past 
literature merits and limitations. The first section focuses on the impact of the welfare 
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state in the economic incorporation of immigrants. The second section covers the 
relationship between the welfare state and the social capital of foreign-born individuals. 
The chapter finishes with the research questions and hypotheses which constitute the 
focus of this study. Additionally, it includes a section highlighting the contribution of this 
study to the literature.  
Chapter 4 deals with the methods portion of the study. The data sets employed are 
discussed as well as the construction of dependent, predictor and control variables. The 
end of the chapter includes a section devoted to the data analysis plan.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the results of the study. It is dedicated to answering the 
research questions and hypotheses exposed in the third chapter of this study.  
Chapter 6 concentrates on the discussion of the results stemming from the data 
analyses in light of the theoretical framework developed in the second chapter. 
Additionally, it delineates the limitations of the study and proposes an agenda for future 
research.    
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Chapter Two 
 
The Welfare State as Agent of Immigrant Incorporation: The Theory 
Foreign-born individuals are among the most vulnerable populations in receiving 
societies. Even the most educated face disadvantages when they compete in the labor 
market with comparable native-born individuals. In addition, in order to participate in the 
social sphere of the new countries, immigrants frequently have to compromise their 
cultural practices and overcome challenges such as language barriers and discrimination. 
Immigrants have faced up to and risen above these and other challenges for centuries, and 
current migration is no exception. However, in contemporary migration, unlike in earlier 
periods, destination countries are predominantly welfare states, and for the first time the 
foreign-born have access to benefits traditionally reserved only for citizens. In his report 
for The Council of Europe as regards the integration of immigrants Niessen indicates, 
“Equal access to the institutions of the welfare state is viewed as key in integrating 
foreign-born population. These policies are based on the notion of equality of all 
individuals before law” (2000, p. 31).   
Study of the potential influence of the welfare state on the immigrants’ settlement 
process is very recent in the literature, so recent that there is not yet a clear understanding 
of the theoretical mechanism underlying it. This should not come as a surprise, given that 
this subject involves unraveling the interaction of two social science constructs, the 
welfare state and immigrant incorporation, which themselves need further exploration. To 
make matters still more complex, these social science constructs (welfare state and 
immigrant incorporation) are opposed, at least theoretically, in two different ways. First, 
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the welfare state was originally created to guarantee the well-being of citizens, so that 
preventing access to non-members (non-citizens) was essential for its survival. Second, it 
involves investigating how the welfare state contributes to the social incorporation of 
minority groups into the referent society, and therefore to societal cohesion. Yet both 
multiculturalism and belonging to a minority have been associated in the literature with 
social division.  
With these antecedents in mind, it will take several steps to unravel the theoretical 
mechanism underlying the role of the welfare state as a moderator of immigrant 
settlement processes. The first step will trace the transformation of the welfare state into 
an incorporation mechanism and the potential implications for the well-being of 
newcomers.  The second step will define welfare state and immigrant incorporation in the 
context of this research. The last step will be devoted to how the mechanism operates, 
that is, how the welfare state influences the economic and social incorporation of foreign-
born populations.  
 
The Welfare State, from “Members- Only” to Incorporation Mechanism 
Granting non-citizens access to social citizenship was contrary to the original 
foundations of the modern welfare state. To explore the role of the welfare state in the 
incorporation of immigrants it is necessary to understand first how the welfare state 
evolved from a “citizens-only covenant” to Europe’s preferred structural mechanism for 
the incorporation of immigrants.  
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The postwar period witnessed the emergence of three interrelated phenomena in 
Europe: the expansion of the welfare state, the creation of international accords on 
individual human rights, and the creation of guest-worker programs.  
The welfare state was founded on the pillars of the nation-state: territory and 
citizenship. Welfare states were therefore conceived as inward-oriented entities designed 
to guarantee the well-being of the members of a nation. Citizenship was the original 
criterion for access to welfare benefits. In addition, the authority and survival of the 
welfare state was assured through a binding contractual relationship with the members of 
a given territory.  Citizens supported distributive justice in exchange for state protection 
in case of adversity. To last, this relationship had to be an exclusive one between the 
parties.  
Foreign labor was considered a threat to the sustainability of the welfare state.  
Allowing non-citizens to enjoy the privileges set aside for citizens would jeopardize the 
contractual relationship between the state and its citizens. Hence citizens would be 
expected to withdraw their support for the welfare state if immigrants were granted parity 
in accessing social rights. The expectation was that states would prevent newcomers from 
gaining access to the social rights of citizens in order to protect the existence of the 
welfare system (Freeman, 1986).  
This assumption about the welfare state’s behavior toward foreign-born 
populations was proven wrong. Newcomers’ basic social rights are presently not different 
from those of citizens in most European nations (Soysal, 1994). This counter-intuitive 
development of the immigrants’ relationship with the welfare state stemmed from two 
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related phenomena: the establishment of individual human rights and the ending of the 
guest-worker programs aimed at rebuilding post-war Europe.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and subsequent international 
treaties designed to protect individual basic rights (i.e., the European Convention on 
Human Rights of 1950) had two main repercussions for the social rights of immigrant 
populations. First, a supra-national movement was started, in which it was the 
international community that became ultimately responsible for guaranteeing the basic 
rights of individuals. Second, a subsequent repercussion was that personhood and 
residency replaced nationality as the criteria for individuals’ social citizenship.  
The internationalization of individual human rights expanded the nation-states’ 
accountability for the well-being of non-citizens. The contractual relationship by which 
the sovereign state and its citizens agreed to support the welfare state was no longer 
applicable, because citizenship and territory were no longer criteria for exclusion.  A new 
model of transnational membership founded on personhood had emerged, in which 
residency replaced citizenship as the criterion for social membership (Jacobson, 1996; 
Soysal, 1994). 
The contractual relationship between the welfare state and non-citizens 
consolidated after the 70’s oil crisis. Europe not only brought to an end the guest-worker 
programs initiated after the war, but also locked its borders to further immigration of 
foreign labor. A substantial number of guest workers decided not to return to their home 
countries after the programs ended. Host nations coped with the unforeseen challenge of 
incorporating newcomers into their social fabric, mainly by adopting two strategies. First, 
immigrants were granted the right of family reunification.  The post-war emphasis on 
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basic human rights contributed to considering family reunification as an undeniable 
individual right. Second, immigrants were granted access to the same social rights as 
nationals. Two related factors contributed to this phenomenon.  
First, as stated above, a new contractual relationship based on residency was 
established between the welfare state and the individuals living within its territory.  
Second, as a result of this, the principle of equality under the law held for immigrants and 
nationals alike. Not only were non-citizens granted access to social rights, but the extent 
and distribution of resources had to be equivalent for both nationals and residents. Most 
of the recipient countries therefore opted to grant newcomers access to the mechanisms 
of social protection designed originally for citizens (Guiraudon, 1998; 2000).  
The unfolding of the above mentioned post-war events in Europe transformed 
advanced welfare states from inward-oriented entities, designed to serve only citizens, 
into a preferred mechanism for the incorporation of immigrants into the economic and 
social fabric of the recipient societies (Freeman, 2004; 2007).  
The transformation of the welfare state into a mechanism of “incorporation” led 
the scholarly community to speculate about its impact on the newcomers’ well-being. 
The fact that welfare states opened the door to social citizenship for immigrants on an 
equal basis did not mean that the amount and scope of social provisions were evenly 
distributed across nations. The understanding of social citizenship stemmed from the 
nations’ welfare identity, and therefore the range of public policy outcomes varied 
accordingly (Bommes & Geddes, 2000; Castles, 1993). This led some researchers to 
anticipate that the incorporation of newcomers would depend, to a certain extent, on the 
type of welfare system they had access to. The reason was that social and economic 
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opportunities for migrants were different across welfare systems. This diversity of 
opportunities would, in turn, have an impact on how newcomers situated themselves in 
specific layers of the recipient society’s social fabric (Baldwin-Edwards, 1991, 2004; 
Baldwin-Edwards & Schain, 1994; Faist, 1995, 1996).  
At this point it is important to distinguish between two aspects of the relationship 
of non-citizens to advanced welfare systems in Europe. The first aspect is the extent to 
which welfare systems actually determine the social entitlements of foreign labor in 
recipient societies. The assessment of the differences in the regulations for giving 
immigrants access to social rights across welfare regimes is straightforward. The 
literature offers excellent examples of cross-national conceptual comparisons. Dorr and 
Faist (1997), for instance, investigated whether degree of immigrant integration could be 
related to differences in their social entitlements in several countries with different 
welfare traditions: Germany, France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. They reported 
that the social entitlements offered to foreign labor did indeed vary across countries. 
Furthermore, given the vulnerability of the immigrant population in the labor market, 
they anticipated that comprehensive welfare provisions, aimed at the entire population, 
were better for the integration of immigrants than were residual measures designed only 
for specific groups. Examining the United States, Germany, and Sweden as representative 
of the Liberal, Conservative, and Social-Democratic welfare regimes respectively, 
Sainsbury (2006) reached a similar conclusion. Social entitlements for non-citizens 
differed across welfare systems. Moreover, she observed a pattern wherein the degree of 
welfare generosity was associated positively with the social entitlements granted to 
immigrants. 
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Approaching it from the perspective of the majority, the native-born population, 
Banting (2000) examined whether societies with expansive welfare systems withdrew 
support for social protection schemes after the non-citizens became settled. Not only did 
he not observe such a pattern, but he arrived at the conclusion that comprehensive social 
protection schemes were more effective than residual ones for the incorporation of 
immigrants into receiving societies.  
 The second aspect of the relationship of the welfare state to non-citizens revolves 
around the actual impact of the variation in social entitlements across systems on 
immigrants’ patterns of incorporation. In other words, which characteristics of the 
welfare state are “responsible” for the potential differences in immigrant incorporation 
outcomes? More importantly, how do these characteristics operate? Unlike with the 
previous aspect, there is no straightforward answer to these questions. With a few 
exceptions, which are presented below, the impact of the welfare state’s theoretical traits 
on the incorporation of immigrants into recipient societies has not been explored in the 
literature. To make matters more complicated, there is not a univocal understanding in 
the literature of the constructs “welfare state” and “immigrant incorporation.” Therefore, 
in a second step, the meaning of “welfare state” and “immigrant incorporation” will be 
clarified in the context of this research in order to, in a third step, discuss the 
interpretations offered by past scholars on how the welfare state mediates the economic 
and social incorporation of immigrants.  
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 Defining the Constructs 
The construct of welfare state. 
In his seminal work The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) contested two popular ideas held by welfare scholars at the time: namely, that 
welfare states were uniform entities and that there was a linear relationship between 
welfare expenditure and mitigation of inequality. Instead, he sustained that welfare states 
were highly complex entities that varied in their ability to alleviate social and economic 
disparity. According to Esping-Andersen (1990) this variability was the result of specific 
institutional developments deriving from the interplay of decommodification, social 
stratification and the influence of the market, the family and the state on individual’s 
welfare. Furthermore, he anticipated that this variability was not random; rather, welfare 
states followed a pattern of three ideal types or clusters: Liberal, Conservative and Social-
Democratic.  
Countries belonging to the Liberal welfare cluster, such as the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, were characterized by a heavy reliance on means-tested programs and 
residual universal and social insurance plans. Liberal welfare regimes trusted the market 
and private insurance schemes to guarantee citizens’ welfare.  State intervention to 
counteract the pervasive effects of the market on the vulnerable population was 
practically inexistent. Social benefits, provided mainly through means-tested programs, 
were very limited and strongly regulated. This system did not prioritize the redistribution 
of wealth as a means to foster social parity. In fact, it created a highly differentiated 
system of class dualism between recipients of welfare assistance and the rest of society. 
Welfare recipients, comprising mainly minorities and the low-income working class, 
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were usually stigmatized in this system. Their welfare dependency was interpreted as 
proof of their failure to succeed in the labor market due to their personal decisions or 
inadequate moral standards (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26-29 & 61-65).  
The Corporatist or Conservative welfare regime was situated in between the 
Liberal and the Social-Democratic clusters with regards to its ability to foster social 
egalitarianism. In this system, benefits were designed to perpetuate social class and 
status. State intervention to regulate the market was not the preferred strategy to foster 
social equity. Rather, the Conservative welfare cluster’s trademark way of moderating the 
harmful consequences of a liberal economy was its reliance on pension programs 
administered by state insurance schemes. Countries in this cluster matched the benefits of 
individuals to their market position and performance. Another characteristic of this 
regime was that it encouraged the concept of the traditional family by tying social 
benefits to the male breadwinner’s earnings and to his occupational status.  Furthermore, 
social benefits were allotted to the family unit instead of to particular individuals and 
were provided mainly as monetary transfers rather than as services. These redistribution 
practices created a distinct “corporatist” social pattern, which perpetuated societal 
structures by replicating the market position and performance of individuals. Countries 
like Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany were classified as belonging to this 
conservative or corporatist welfare cluster (Esping-Andersen 1990: 47-54 &84-86).  
The third type of welfare regime, and the one that in theory was most successful 
regarding wealth redistribution and the promotion of social justice, was the Social-
Democratic model. Examples of countries grouped under this regime were Denmark, 
Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. One of the salient characteristics of the 
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countries under this welfare cluster was that redistribution strategies were embedded 
within a strict control of the liberal labor market. The rationale underlying this practice 
was a commitment to full employment. A pivotal feature of countries under this regime 
was that social provisions were universal, egalitarian and based on residency rather than 
market performance. In addition, their preferred strategy for financing the welfare system 
consisted of schemes based on taxation rather than contributions, and these schemes 
supported the redistribution of generous social benefits. Esping-Andersen argued that the 
broad scope and the redistribution practices of this type of welfare state produced in the 
population a sense of universal solidarity that was accompanied by a lack of 
stigmatization attached to welfare use. Because every person was equally eligible for 
welfare, all individuals had the same rights and enjoyed the same privileges regardless of 
market position or social status (1990: 27-29 & 65-78).   
No other piece of research on advanced welfare states has been as influential and 
as contested as The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. This is not surprising given that 
all countries possess a mixture of characteristics from different regimes. Even though the 
similarities that exist among countries in each welfare type make a regime taxonomy 
possible, the fact is that no country represents a perfect example of any one of the welfare 
clusters. The regimes theory should therefore be considered a qualitative classification of 
welfare states, and the different regimes described in it should be deemed ideal types.   
The welfare state has become a subject of social scientific study in its own right 
since the publication of the Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. There is a vast body of 
literature devoted to the topic of welfare state modeling which covers a wide range of 
topics: modes of welfare classification, number of regimes, nature of the welfare systems, 
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research methods employed, and so on (i.e. Arts  & Gelissen, 2002 offers and excellent 
review of the state-of-art on the subject of welfare state modeling).  
Although the focus of this study is not welfare state modeling, there are 
limitations in the original classification that need to be addressed in order to clarify the 
concept of the welfare state pertinent to this research.  
Additions to the original welfare state classification. 
Some authors have argued that social policy measures affect women and men 
differently and that the welfare regimes theory does not correspond to the actual 
dynamics of gender. They argue that women’s access to social citizenship does not 
follow the patterns and scope of men’s because women do not access the labor market at 
the same rate as men. Consequently, their access to social benefits deriving from 
employment is less than that of their male counterparts. Women and men also 
experienced different employment conditions and the related social benefits. Women 
hold part-time positions more often than men and therefore are not eligible for the many 
social benefits deriving from full-time contracts.  Furthermore, unlike men, women 
sometimes have to depend on their marital or maternal status to be able to make claims to 
benefits not stemming from employment (Bambra, 2007a; Sainsbury, 1999; Williams, 
1995).  
Other authors disagree with Esping-Andersen’s claim that the Southern European 
countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) constitute an under-developed Conservative 
cluster. In their opinion those countries are part of a distinct type of welfare cluster which 
they called Southern or Mediterranean (Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996).  
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According to these scholars, the Mediterranean welfare regime has characteristics 
of both the Social-Democratic and the Conservative regimes. This is, its welfare effort is 
moderate and its scope is limited. One of the redistribution practices of the Mediterranean 
welfare regime is the reliance on pensions in the form of cash benefits matching previous 
market position and performance. Although this practice might bear some resemblance to 
that of the Corporatist- Conservative regime, the Mediterranean regime displays a benefit 
“polarization” that is manifested in the over-protection of full-time, white-collar 
employees in the institutional market. Furthermore, another attribute of the 
Mediterranean welfare regime makes it similar to the Social- Democratic system, namely, 
the institutionalization of universal health care. However, access to health care in the 
Mediterranean welfare regime is not egalitarian, as it is in the Social- Democratic regime, 
for in the former public employees are exceptionally privileged with regard to special 
benefits and coverage. In addition, because of the array of services to the private sector 
that the state subsidizes, the boundaries between the public and the private sectors with 
regards to health care provisions are quite ill-defined in the Mediterranean welfare 
regime.  The Mediterranean welfare regime is also distinctive in that it encourages a high 
degree of familial bonding and it fosters “clientelistic relationships” with certain groups 
of the population, in the form of cash subsidies given in exchange for political and social 
commitments (Ferrera, 1996).  
Also relevant to this study is the question of how to categorize the Eastern 
European countries in terms of their social policy. While more uniform in this regard 
during the Communist regime, countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
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Slovenia and Slovakia have diversified their social policy during the post-Socialist 
transition (Ferge & Juhász, 2004; Heidenreich, 2003; Manning, 2004; Potucek, 2004). 
Universalism was the trademark of these countries’ policies during the Socialist 
period, and despite diversification during the transition to democracy, there are still 
common elements of social policy among Eastern European countries. Some health and 
educational services have been privatized, and many subsidies for housing and other 
goods have been abolished, including those related to maternal rights. Provisions of 
social services have been transferred to the local communities, resulting in more 
discretionary delivery of services. In addition, most of these countries lack a well-
developed strategy to protect the unemployed (Deacon, 2000). 
The development of the welfare state in the post-Socialist countries is still under-
researched, and it is too early to predict how they will develop: whether they will follow 
one or another of the already established models of social citizenship or whether a new 
model or models will surface (Kovács, 2002).  
Returning to the original question of how to classify the former Socialist 
countries, given their common institutional and historical development and following the 
lead of past scholars, it seems appropriate to group these countries into a separate Eastern 
welfare regime.  
In summary, although authors disagree on a unique typology of welfare 
classification, Ferrera’s (1996) approach is considered one of the most precise (Bambra, 
2007a, 2007b). Following Eikemo, Huisman, Bambra and Kunst (2008), this study 
employs Ferrera’s classification with the addition of a fifth cluster comprised of the 
Eastern regimes plus Ukraine (see figure 1).  
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The construct of immigrant incorporation. 
The assortment of alternatives offered in the literature to name and describe the 
process that a foreign-born person follows after deciding to move to a new society is 
extensive: Immigrant integration, assimilation, adaptation, acculturation, incorporation. 
Political, cultural, economical and social; homogeneous versus multicultural societies; 
structural versus local processes. Moreover, the subject is open-ended, the terminology is 
highly abstract and value-laden and, to make matters even more complex, the discussion 
is not static but in constant transformation. Therefore, the best way to proceed for the 
purpose of this study is to define the meaning of immigrant incorporation in the context 
of this research.  
 The turning point for the processes involved in immigrant settlement can be 
traced to the mid-1960s. Scholars started then to question the dominant idea that with the 
passage of time immigrants would acquire the social, economical and cultural traits of the 
native population to such an extent that, eventually, there would be no differences 
between groups. This theory, known as assimilation, held that immigrants and natives 
were two distinct, homogenous groups and that for societies to function successfully the 
newcomers had to emulate the native-born (Gordon, 1964). Evidence proved the theory 
inaccurate. Differences between the native population and the offspring of immigrants 
persisted even after several generations. In addition to the empirical evidence, another 
factor that contributed to the discrediting and later abandonment of the assimilation 
theory was the nature of its moral foundation. Assimilation entailed an irreversible trade-
  20 
off process whereby minorities had to abandon their identities to become part of the 
referent society.  
 Both empirical evidence and the negative connotations associated with the 
assimilation theory moved the scientific community in the opposite direction. As a result, 
great emphasis was placed on protecting and nurturing the newcomers’ ethnic and 
cultural differences as a way of easing their settlement into host societies. This new 
theory was called multiculturalism. It ranged from the communitarian pluralism 
approach, which sustained that immigrants should be granted unlimited rights to foster 
their own traditions (Champion, 1999), to milder forms, like the liberal multiculturalism 
approach, which defended equality for minorities while accounting for the traditions of 
recipient societies as well (Loobuyck, 2005).   
The debate only intensified when the multicultural approach did not yield the 
expected outcomes (Entzinger, 2003; Joppke & Morawska, 2003), and authors started to 
question whether a “return to assimilation” was occurring as a result (Alba & Nee 1997; 
Brubaker, 2003; Ireland, 2004).  
Critical of both the absolutizing of the multicultural approach and the simplistic 
discrediting of the assimilation theory, Brubaker (2001) argued that a more complex 
analysis was needed to understand contemporary processes of immigrant incorporation. 
He maintained that immigrants became assimilated, but that the concept of assimilation 
had changed. It had shifted from a power dynamic, where the immigrant was a passive 
subject expected to become a “duplicate native,” to an abstract process where the migrant 
became like a native in certain aspects under specific circumstances which varied across 
groups. Under this re-conceptualization of assimilation, immigrants are not passive 
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subjects, but protagonists of their own process of incorporation. The change does not 
occur at the individual level, nor is it a matter of passing from one homogenous group to 
another. The process takes place across generations and from one set of heterogeneous 
characteristics to another set, similar to that of the referent population. In addition, 
assimilation is multifaceted and it involves defining for each process the context, the 
circumstances, the groups, the period of time, etc.  
This new way of understanding assimilation, - viewing it as becoming similar to 
some extent to a particular referent population-, fits particularly well in the context of this 
research. Here the welfare state is conceptualized as the facilitator of the immigrants’ 
process of becoming like the natives in terms of social citizenship. Incorporation, then, is 
the process whereby immigrants become similar to the referent population with regards to 
social citizenship or- access to social rights- outcomes. Incorporation is thus equivalent to 
the re-conceptualized assimilation notion in the sense that the welfare state is expected to 
empower immigrants to become “like natives” with respect to welfare outcomes.  
So far this study has covered the two first steps announced at the beginning of the 
chapter. The first step has explained how the welfare state became an active mechanism 
for the incorporation of immigrants. The second step has focused on how to understand 
the constructs of welfare state and immigrant incorporation in the context of this research. 
The next step involves unraveling how the theoretical characteristics of the welfare state 
operate to facilitate, or fail to facilitate, the economic and social incorporation of 
immigrants into host societies. In other words, how do different welfare states impact the 
economic and social incorporation of immigrants? Do advanced welfare states act as a 
“redistributive apparatus” of wealth for immigrant populations? And does the degree of 
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welfare generosity diminish differences between natives and foreigners with regards to 
economic well-being and social outcomes?  
 
How the Welfare State Mediates the Incorporation of Immigrants 
The welfare state as agent of immigrant economic incorporation. 
 There is not a clear understanding in the literature about how the welfare state 
operates to influence the economic incorporation of foreign labor into the economic 
fabric of the recipient society. Nevertheless, scholars seem to agree that two welfare 
characteristics play a significant role: re-distribution practices and flexibility of access to 
the labor market. 
To understand the interplay of those two factors it is necessary to return briefly to 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) conjectures on the relationship between the welfare state and 
the liberal market. The underlying principle for the creation of the welfare state was to 
provide a “safety net” to compensate for the economic inequalities stemming from a 
liberal economy. Given this rationale, the impact of the welfare state on the economic 
incorporation of immigrants seems straightforward: newcomers usually experience a 
greater risk of suffering economic hardship than their native counterparts; therefore, 
countries with expansive redistributive practices would provide the best protection 
against the economic disadvantages associated with settling in a new country with a 
liberal market economy (Banting, 2000; Dorr & Faist, 1997). Several studies have 
focused on testing the aforementioned hypotheses among native populations, by 
investigating the relationship between the welfare state and inequality reduction. Scruggs 
and Allan (2006) compared the capability of unemployment, sickness and pension 
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insurance programs to alleviate poverty across 16 countries with advanced economies. 
Findings revealed that in countries with comprehensive social benefits, individuals 
enjoyed higher living standards than in countries with residual systems of protection. 
Furthermore, generous benefits correlated significantly to poverty reduction, although the 
structure of social policies was more informative than welfare generosity per se. These 
findings complemented and expanded prior research, which had reported a significant 
and positive correlation between redistributive welfare systems and poverty and 
inequality reduction across welfare states (Kenworthy, 1999; Kim, 2000; Korpi & Palme 
2004; Mitchell, 1991; Mitchell, Natsem & Gruen, 1994).  
Authors have argued that the impact of the welfare state on the economic 
incorporation of newcomers may be more complex than as posited above and that the 
interplay of market flexibility and re-distribution practices of the state yields two well-
differentiated syndromes which propitiate distinctive incorporation outcomes (Engelen, 
2003; Kogan, 2007a). Accordingly, the institutional syndrome of mobility, corresponding 
to countries under a Liberal welfare cluster, is characterized by fairly opened labor 
markets paired with residual social provisions. Conversely, the attributes of the 
institutional syndrome of protection, corresponding to countries under the Social-
Democratic and conservative systems, are protected access to labor markets coupled with 
more generous social provisions. 
To understand how these two systems influence the economic incorporation of 
foreign-born individuals, it is important to recall the definition of immigrant 
incorporation as the process by which the well-being of non-citizens becomes similar to 
that of citizens through the facilitation by the welfare system. Scholars therefore 
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anticipated that in welfare systems under the institutional syndrome of mobility, 
immigrants would incorporate into the workforce more easily than in regimes under the 
institutional syndrome of protection. The rationale is that newcomers would have less 
difficulties finding employment in countries with markets that validate their education 
and do not restrict their access to specific areas of work than they would in countries with 
highly protected markets in which foreigners are permitted to work in specific areas not 
occupied by the native-born population. As a consequence, the difference in rate of labor 
market participation and performance between natives and foreigners would be smaller in 
welfare states with open markets than in systems where foreigners are restricted from 
access to particular segments of the market. 
 At the same time, open-market systems are also characterized by residual 
schemes of social protection, since they rely mainly on the market to guarantee the well-
being of the population. This may result in large economic disparities in the population 
and create a higher risk of economic deprivation due to unemployment or under-
employment. Therefore, despite having easier access to the labor market, the foreign-
born, particularly at the early stages of the settlement process, may not achieve parity 
with the native population in terms of their ability to compete in the labor market. In 
addition, their participation in the workforce may be less steady than that of their native 
counterparts. Consequently, in welfare systems with stricter market regulations and 
expansive welfare provisions the differences between immigrants and natives regarding 
overall economic well-being would be smaller than in open-market systems. The 
rationale is that in the more redistributive systems immigrants would not have to be 
active members of the workforce to have their basic needs covered. In addition, unlike in 
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residual welfare systems, the disadvantages associated with the migratory process in 
terms of the ability to compete in the labor market would not automatically translate into 
economic hardship (Faist, 1996; Rueda & Pontusson, 2000).  
In a word, with regards to the economic incorporation of immigrants, welfare 
states can be divided into those that rely more on the market and those which rely more 
on the system of social protection. Past literature seems to indicate that welfare states will 
facilitate immigrants become part of the labor force on par with the natives more easily in 
the former, but their economic stability and overall well-being would be better 
guaranteed in systems that employ comprehensive social protection mechanisms.  
 
The welfare state as agent of immigrant social incorporation 
Titmuss (1965) was convinced that the welfare state was more than the sum of its 
social policies. He believed that societies organized around people’s well-being created a 
sense of common solidarity that generated social cohesion. There is little disagreement 
that social capital, is at the core of societal cohesion (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). What 
needs further exploration, however, is the role of the welfare state as generator of social 
capital and the implications of this mechanism for the social incorporation of immigrants. 
Putnam & Goss (2004) observed: 
 
     The myriad ways in which the state encourages and discourages the formation of 
social capital have been underresearched. Do certain types of economic policies-say, 
those aimed at mitigating income inequality- facilitate the building of social capital 
across lines? […] Such questions represent some of the many largely unexplored 
frontiers in social capital research. (p.17) 
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Social capital, frequently assessed by social trust indicators, has been defined as 
“features of social life -networks, norms, and trust- that enable participants to act together 
more effectively to pursue shared objectives” (Putnam, 1995, p. 664). 
Prior research on the relationship between the welfare state, social capital and 
immigration has focused either on the negative impact of ethnic diversity and 
multiculturalism on the social capital of advanced welfare states (Bjørnskov, 2007; 
Cheong, Edwards, Goulbourne & Solomos, 2007; Coffé & Geys, 2006) or on individual-
level factors such as belonging to an ethnic minority or being foreign-born which have 
often been associated with lower levels of social capital for communities of immigrants 
as compared to the native population (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000, 2002; Putnam, 2000, 
2007). However, very little is known about the influence of welfare states on the social 
capital formation of immigrant communities as opposed to the native-born population.  
As with economic incorporation, do advanced welfare states act as a “redistributive 
apparatus” of social capital for immigrant populations? In other words, does the degree of 
welfare generosity diminish differences between natives and foreigners with regards to 
social capital? In addition, do different welfare systems differentially influence the 
generation of social capital?  
Scholars have very recently started to investigate the role of the welfare state as 
generator of social capital among the general population. Two opposite perspectives 
dominate the literature, and one must go back to the theories on how social capital is 
generated to understand the origin of the discrepancy. Researchers who claim that social 
capital occurs mainly at the individual level, as a result of norms of reciprocity stemming 
from civil participation, believe that advanced welfare states hinder the accumulation of 
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social capital. Their argument is that pre-welfare state societies relied on networks of 
informal solidarity to guarantee the well-being of their members. Before the development 
of the welfare state, family members, communities, and organizations like the church, 
unions and guilds were responsible for the needs of individuals in distress. This type of 
informal solidarity was based on norms of reciprocity that promoted regular social 
interactions and therefore fostered the accumulation of social capital.  According to these 
scholars, the establishment of the welfare state put an end to this mechanism of social 
capital formation. When the state became the ultimate agency responsible for citizens’ 
well-being, the need for social networks of informal solidarity diminished. In addition, 
citizens’ ability to work with one another stemmed from having a need to do so, and 
advanced welfare states suppressed this need and, ultimately, the ability. Scholars who 
claim that advanced welfare states are detrimental for the formation of social capital also 
believe that, when states assume activities that belong to the civil society, citizens 
become dependent and lose the ability to work together. In turn, citizens become more 
individualistic and less trusting of one another, which leads to a general decline in civil 
participation and therefore to a decline in the formation of social capital (Etzioni, 1995; 
Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 2000; Wolfe 1991).  
Scholars who argue that there is a positive correlation between welfare 
development and social capital accumulation represent the opposite view. At the micro 
level, their reasoning is that generous social systems may actually facilitate informal 
social contacts among individuals by granting resources that influence the amount of free 
time they have and the quality of their social interactions. When the state guarantees the 
basic needs of the population, individuals do not have to invest as much time in providing 
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for the well-being of themselves and their families. This allows people not only to invest 
their time in nurturing their social ties, but also to improve the quality of the interactions. 
When the state provides for the care of vulnerable groups (elderly, children, single-parent 
families, etc.), it lifts the burden from family members, and this relief contributes 
positively to the nature of their interactions (Rostila, 2008, p. 30).  
Past research shows that the quality of interactions among family members of 
different generations is higher in countries with advanced welfare states as opposed to 
those with residual systems (Kohli, 1999; Fritzell & Lennartsson, 2005). This rationale is 
also in line with Inglehart’s (2006) cultural values approach. According to this author, 
there is a universal pattern of in-group solidarity, on which societies with under-
developed welfare systems must rely in order to guarantee their survival. As societies 
develop to welfare states and peoples’ survival is guaranteed by the state, individuals give 
greater importance to their own well-being and quality of life.  
At the macro level, an argument in support of the welfare state as generator of 
social capital is that the relationship between the welfare state and the third sector does 
not entail a zero-sum competition. Actually, advanced welfare states and the civil society 
have historically maintained close ties of mutual collaboration. A common practice of the 
state in countries with generous social policies has been to foster civic associations by 
granting them economic resources and tax benefits. Likewise, civic associations have 
become instrumental in helping states to redistribute resources effectively and provide 
services to the population (Kuhnle & Alestalo, 2000; Kuhnle & Selle, 1990).  Social and 
economic inequality have been systematically associated with lower levels of social 
capital (Inglehart, 1999; Bjornskov, 2006). Another argument employed to show the 
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positive impact of developed welfare states on the formation of social capital is that 
social welfare promotes social parity. Inequality fragments the civil society into inward-
oriented groups that perceive other groups as completely different. Perceived differences 
lead to less contact among groups and greater distrust, which in turn erode social capital 
(Uslaner, 2002; 2003).  
If, as is claimed, the welfare state can influence social capital, the next question is 
how does it do so? What is the causal mechanism? In an attempt to answer these 
questions, some authors have claimed that welfare states can both create and destroy 
social capital, depending on the design of their social policies. The hypothesis is that the 
role of the welfare state as generator of social capital is not exclusively a question of 
welfare effort (welfare expenditure) but of welfare design (welfare scope). Specifically, 
some scholars have posited that the degree of universalism in a given welfare regime, as 
opposed to its reliance on residual programs, is related to societies’ social capital (or lack 
thereof) (Kumlin, 2004; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein 1998).  
Welfare policy design operates in three different ways to generate or to diminish 
social capital. First, equal access to social rights benefits gives people a sense of equality 
of opportunity. Social trust is at the core of social capital, and believing that one can 
influence one’s own future is a pivotal element for the generation of social trust.  Having 
equal access to services like health and education fosters social trust by nurturing 
people’s optimism about their own future. However, in systems where re-distribution 
depends on the market and where social rights are granted only in cases of extreme need, 
people do not feel they have the same opportunities, since their future heavily depends on 
their workforce performance (Rothstein, 1998; Uslaner, 2002).  
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Second, societies in which all individuals have the same access to resources are 
more trusting and cohesive because people are more inclined to perceive themselves as 
part of the same community. However, in societies where people in need are singled out 
and become the target of specific social programs, social trust and therefore social 
cohesion are more difficult to generate, because different groups might perceive that they 
have little in common with each other (Larsen, 2007; Rothstein & Stolle, 2003). In 
addition, in these societies people who rely on means-tested programs (benefits granted 
based upon eligibility) may be perceived as a burden by the rest of the population, and 
such a situation contributes even further to the erosion of social cohesion (Titmuss, 
1976).   
 The third explanation for why welfare design affects social capital is related to the 
concept of procedural justice. Procedural justice research suggests that being fairly 
treated when dealing with public institutions is as important to people as getting a 
positive outcome (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Procedural justice can be applied to the welfare 
state’s capacity to promote social capital. The argument is that procedural justice is 
embedded in the nature and delivery of social services in the welfare state. As opposed to 
universal social services, where people are treated with the same respect by the welfare 
institutions, in residual systems each individual case must be deemed worthy of the 
service (Rothstein, 1998). Compared to welfare recipients in universal systems, 
individuals in selective systems are therefore more susceptible to arbitrary practices that 
lead to distrust and hinder the generation of social capital (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).  
 To summarize, little is known about how the welfare state “operates” to 
incorporate immigrant populations into the social fabric of recipient societies. Does social 
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capital differ systematically across welfare regimes among immigrant communities?  And 
is the gap between natives and foreign-born on reported social capital smaller in more 
redistributive social systems? These questions have not yet been explored in the literature 
in a comparative setting. It has recently been proposed that the welfare states may impact 
social capital formation, but scholars disagree as to whether the nature of this influence is 
positive or negative. In addition, some authors have conjectured that a causal mechanism 
exists between welfare scope (i.e. reliance on means-tested versus non means-tested 
benefits) and social capital formation. However, the literature on welfare state and social 
capital is in its very early stages of development. Therefore, it is difficult to anticipate 
how different welfare systems will impact the incorporation of immigrant populations. 
Not only is the theoretical development of how the welfare state might impact social 
cohesion at a very early stage of development, but there is also not an adequate 
theoretical framework of how this mechanism might apply to immigrant populations. 
This study is an attempt to fill this lacuna in the literature by exploring the impact of the 
welfare state on the social capital formation of foreign-born communities. It investigates 
two aspects in particular. The first one focuses on the welfare state as generator of social 
capital. It explores whether the reported social capital of immigrant populations differ 
across countries representative of different welfare states. The second aspect takes a step 
further and investigates the impact of the welfare state on the social cohesion of 
multicultural societies. For that this study focuses on the difference between natives and 
immigrants on reported social capital indicators. The expectation is that the more 
successful the welfare system in incorporating immigrants the smaller the difference in 
social capital indicators between immigrants and natives.  
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 As stated in the introduction, this chapter has laid the theoretical foundation of 
how the welfare state facilitates the economic and social incorporation of foreign-born 
individuals into recipient societies. The welfare state originated as the mechanism to 
protect vulnerable populations from the inequalities derived from liberal labor markets. 
Immigrants often find themselves at a disadvantage in competing with natives in host 
societies’ markets. Thus, the anticipation is that immigrants will fare economically better 
in countries with comprehensive systems of protection.  
 Two opposite perspectives have been proposed as regards to the role of the 
welfare state in the social capital formation of communities. One perspective states that 
generous systems of protection promote social capital by generating a sense of 
community and by increasing the quality of people’s interactions. The opposite 
perspective argues that comprehensive systems of protection erode the formation of 
social capital. The rationale is that developed welfare states diminish the need of 
networks of informal solidarity necessary for the generation of social capital. The 
following chapter reviews past literature testing these theoretical propositions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  33 
Chapter Three 
 
Testing the Theory: Past Empirical Literature on the Impact of the Welfare State 
on the Economic and Social Incorporation of Immigrants.  
 
This chapter reviews the empirical literature concerning the impact of the welfare 
state on the economic and social incorporation of immigrants. The first section examines 
the relationship between different welfare regimes and the economic incorporation of 
foreigners into recipient societies and explores the factors associated with it. The second 
section investigates the role of the welfare state in promoting the social capital (social 
incorporation) of immigrants and the factors associated with it.  
 
The Welfare State as Agent of Immigrants’ Economic Incorporation 
Research on the relationship between the welfare state and international migration 
is not new; there is an extensive body of literature devoted to it (for an overview, see 
Nannestad, 2007). Four approaches have predominated prior research on the relationship 
between the welfare state and international labor. The first one has focused on the extent 
to which welfare generosity influences migrants’ settlement decisions (Allard & 
Danziger, 2000; Borjas, 1999). The second approach has explored whether newcomers 
and their descendants assimilate into or out of welfare (Barrett & McCarthy, 2008; 
Hansen & Lofstrom, 2003; Mats, 2009). The third perspective has investigated the claim 
that international labor constitutes a threat to the sustainability of developed welfare 
states (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006; Schierup, Hansen & Castles, 2006). The fourth and 
least developed approach, and which constitutes the focus of this study, has examined 
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how different welfare regimes actually influence the economic incorporation of 
foreigners into the recipient societies and which factors are associated with the process.  
A popular design for exploring how the welfare state affects the economic 
incorporation of foreigners has been to compare immigrants from the same country of 
origin across destinations representative of different regimes. The rationale is that 
divergences in outcomes would reflect the impact of host institutions institutional 
arrangements on the economic incorporation of newcomers. For instance, Kogan (2003, 
2007c) found that, compared to the native-born population, ex-Yugoslav immigrants in 
Sweden participated less in the labor market and had lower occupational status than did 
their counterparts living in Austria. The author suggested that a plausible explanation for 
the divergence in outcomes stemmed from the different welfare arrangements in the two 
countries. In the absence of suitable employment opportunities, the Swedish welfare 
system not only guaranteed the basic needs of the Ex-Yugoslav immigrants, but also 
offered them the opportunity to retire early or to participate in re-qualification programs 
to enhance their chances in the labor market. The Austrian system, on the other hand, did 
not offer the same level of protection, and Ex-Yugoslav immigrants had no choice but to 
participate in the labor market to be able to provide for themselves and their families. 
Another study found that immigrants from the former Soviet Union also achieved better 
occupational status and higher earnings in Canada than did their counterparts in Israel. 
The authors attributed this variation to the Canadian preference for market forces to 
incorporate immigrants, as opposed to the benefit system employed by the Israeli 
government (Lewin-Epstein, Semyonov, Kogan & Wanner, 2003).  
Successive studies on the impact of the welfare state on the economic 
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incorporation of foreigners from multiple origins and a variety of destination countries 
reported a similar pattern. Relative to native-born, immigrants were usually at a 
disadvantage with regards to labor market participation and attainment. Moreover, the 
more advanced the welfare regime, the weaker was the market participation of foreigners. 
Accordingly, Constant and Schultz-Nielsen (2004) found that immigrants in Denmark 
were more often unemployed that their counterparts in Germany and attributed this 
disparity to the generosity of the unemployment benefits of the Nordic country. Similar 
results were obtained by Kesler (2006) who concluded that the system of social 
protection was directly related to the higher unemployment rates of foreigners living in 
Sweden relative to the rates in Britain and Germany. The rationale was that in Germany, 
employment was required to maintain residency, so that immigrants were more willing to 
accept a wider range of jobs in order to stay in the country. Similarly, Britain encouraged 
the labor market participation of immigrants by employing a marginal social protection 
system that did not provide enough coverage in case of unemployment.  
In terms of participation in the highest occupational strata, scholars found that in 
Britain, the opportunities that immigrants had for competing for professional occupations 
with the native-born population were substantially larger than those of their counterparts 
in Germany. Some immigrant groups even outperformed the native population in Britain.  
Likewise, the economic performance of immigrant groups in the UK had a much larger 
range of variation than that of their counterparts in Germany. The rationale is that 
immigrants living in Germany benefited more from the redistribution practices of the 
conservative regime than their counterparts living under the less comprehensive liberal 
system of the UK (Buchel & Frick, 2004).  
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The outcomes of the above studies seem to indicate that the degree of welfare 
protection lessens foreigners’ dependence of labor market participation to guarantee their 
economic well-being. To explain this apparent contradiction, scholars have employed the 
institutional syndromes hypothesis described in the second of this study. This hypothesis 
sustains that Liberal regimes may be more successful in incorporating immigrants into 
the labor market of recipient societies than are Conservative and Social-Democratic 
regimes. The justification is that in countries with an institutional syndrome of mobility, 
immigrants have an easier time accessing the labor market while facing a higher risk of 
poverty and economic hardship in case of unemployment. Conversely, immigrants living 
in countries with the institutional syndrome of protection, corresponding to the Social-
Democratic and Conservative clusters, may have fewer opportunities to access the labor 
market but they will also be less vulnerable to the economic deprivation associated with 
unsteady market participation (Banting, 2000; Engelen, 2003; Faist, 1996).  
The studies presented so far examine immigrants’ market attainment and 
performance across welfare regimes. They seem to indicate that the best labor 
opportunities for foreigners are in countries corresponding to the Liberal regime. 
However, more employment does not necessarily lead to an economic situation 
comparable to that of the native-born population. Immigrants, particularly those 
originally from non-European countries, are usually at disadvantage to compete with the 
native population in host societies markets. The question that still remains, then, is 
whether the redistribution mechanisms of different systems are able to ‘cushion’ the 
negative economic consequences associated with getting settled in a new country. In 
other words: do more comprehensive welfare systems compensate for the economic 
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disadvantages that foreigners face in recipient societies’ labor markets? Do immigrants 
living in countries with generous social benefits fare better economically than immigrants 
living in countries with residual systems of protection? And, is the economic gap between 
natives and foreigners smaller in countries with more developed welfare systems?  
 Morrissens and Sainsbury (2005) attempted to answer these questions by 
comparing households of immigrant and native-born populations in three aspects: the 
likelihood to live above poverty, poverty rate after social transfers, and the poverty rate of 
those for whom social transfers were the only source of income. Results did not support 
the welfare regime theory for foreigners although it was largely sustained for the native-
born population. Only foreigners living in the United States and Sweden, archetypes of 
the Liberal and Social-Democratic regimes respectively, reported outcomes that 
supported the welfare regime theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Accordingly, immigrants 
living in Sweden had the best economic indicators and the smallest differences in 
economic outcomes when compared to citizens, while immigrants living in the United 
States presented the worst economic outcomes and the largest differences as regards 
economic well-being when compared to their native counterparts.  
In addition to not finding support for the welfare regime theory for the immigrant 
population in other countries, outcomes indicated that immigrants fared worse 
economically than did citizens across countries, even if they were active in the labor 
market. The differences were larger for foreigners belonging to minority ethnic groups, 
and social transfers did not compensate for this disparity. Furthermore, immigrants who 
relied on social benefits as their main source of income were at higher risk of poverty 
than were citizens, regardless of type of social protection system.  
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A later study on the welfare state’s ability to reduce poverty confirmed the lack of 
disparity between immigrant and citizen households in Sweden. It also called into 
question the welfare regime theory (Esping-Andersen, 1990) by reporting that the United 
Kingdom, a country representative of the liberal regime, was highly successful in 
preventing poverty among unemployed immigrants (Morissens, 2006). 
Research appears to indicate that countries representative of the Liberal welfare 
regime have fewer difficulties incorporating immigrants into their labor markets than do 
countries representative of other regimes. As for other indicators of economic 
incorporation, such as the redistributive capacity of different systems, only in Sweden do 
immigrants seem to have outcomes similar to those of citizens.  
Despite the instrumental value of these studies for understanding how different 
welfare regimes influence the economic incorporation of international labor, their results 
should be deemed as tentative due to data limitations. The limited number of countries 
and immigrant groups studied makes it difficult to generalize findings. In addition, the 
data used to examine the redistributive impact of different systems was gathered by a 
variety of instruments and data collection procedures. As a result, authors could not 
consistently distinguish between immigrants and citizens across countries. Finally, 
neither the strategy of observing a single immigrant group across destination countries 
nor that of using a variety of immigrant groups across regimes allows researchers to 
determine whether incorporation outcomes are the result of macro-level characteristics of 
the welfare state, of immigrants’ individual traits, or a combination of both. Failing to 
separate individual-level characteristics from contextual characteristics impedes to isolate 
the impact of the different welfare regimes on the economic incorporation of international 
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labor.   
Given the above limitations, in order to better determine how different welfare 
systems influence the economic incorporation of newcomers, it is necessary to turn to 
research that isolate the impact of macro factors while accounting for individuals’ 
characteristics. This type of research design is very recent and only a handful of studies 
have been conducted (see Figure 2 for a description of country level factors employed to 
examine the impact of the welfare state in the economic incorporation of foreign-born 
individuals into recipient societies).  
 
[Figure 2 about here]  
 
One of the first studies conducted employing multilevel analysis investigated the 
impact of the welfare system on immigrants’ household income as compared to that of 
natives. The welfare system was measured in terms of countries’ percentage of GDP 
spent on social benefits and as degree of full access to the social security system. Results 
indicated that individual characteristics accounted for most of the variability in household 
income across welfare systems. Moreover, for the immigrant population, this variability 
was almost insignificant. In addition, immigrant households had consistently lower 
incomes than their native counterparts across countries, and the differences doubled for 
those coming from outside the European Union. Other interesting findings were that 
neither the welfare characteristics nor the percentage of foreign-born in a country were 
significant predictors of these differences (Wanner & Dronkers, 2005).  
A later study investigated the effects of the welfare state on individuals’ 
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unemployment, their occupational status and their likelihood to reach the highest segment 
of the labor market. It included foreign-born individuals from 132 countries of origin 
across 13 European destinations. Results illustrated that foreigners were more often 
unemployed in countries representative of the Conservative regime than in countries 
corresponding to the Social-Democratic system. However, the differences were not 
significant. Significant predictors were countries’ degree of labor market protection, 
which hindered the opportunities of migrants to improve their occupational status, and 
the existence of a Liberal Regime, which was positively associated with foreigners’ 
chances of reaching the highest segment of the market (Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007).    
Employing a different data source, the Labor Force Survey, Kogan (2007a) also 
examined the unemployment rate of foreign-born individuals across European welfare 
systems, and she did find significant differences. Foreign-born individuals migrating 
from other European countries had the highest unemployment rate in countries with a 
Social-Democratic regime. Their prospects of employment increased as they moved to 
countries with a Conservative regime, and those living in countries under a Liberal 
regime were the most frequently employed. The pattern was similar for foreigners 
coming from countries outside the European Union, although the differences were larger. 
Past empirical literature indicates that immigrant economic incorporation varies 
across welfare regimes. What is not clear from previous research is the pattern of 
variation. Although it seems that the Liberal regime is the preferred scenario for the 
economic incorporation of immigrants, at least in terms of market participation, it is 
difficult to reach definitive conclusions given the limited number of studies conducted.  
Another unanswered question deals with the factors associated with this variation. If 
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indeed immigrants are better incorporated economically in the liberal regime, is this due 
to its flexible labor market?  To design effective policies, it is crucial to understand the 
factors associated with positive outcomes of immigrant incorporation. Past research 
conducted to disentangle how macro-level welfare characteristics impact immigrants’ 
economic incorporation has another important shortcoming as well--it only examines the 
outcomes of market participation and performance. Although the right and ability to 
access the labor market is an essential part of the welfare state and the well-being of 
individuals, the welfare state was also created to compensate for the economic 
inequalities derived from liberal markets. In other words, the essence of the welfare state 
is to facilitate economic redistribution to guarantee the well-being of the most vulnerable 
populations in a society.  Immigrants, are usually at a disadvantage in host society 
markets. They face discrimination, their qualifications are often not recognized and, 
especially at the beginning, they might lack the social capital needed to compete with the 
native population in the labor market. Yet past research has hardly examined the ability 
of the welfare state to compensate for these inequalities. There is a need of further 
research, especially concerning the ability of the welfare state to compensate for the 
negative economic consequences associated with settling in a new country.  
 
The Welfare State as Agent of Immigrants’ Social Incorporation 
The role of the welfare state in promoting the social capital (social incorporation) 
of immigrants has seldom been explored. Only a limited number of case studies have 
been conducted in countries representative of the Social-Democratic regime.  However, 
no study has ever systematically examined whether the welfare state impacts the social 
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capital of foreign-born populations across countries. Additionally, no study has explored 
how the welfare system might mitigate the differences in social capital between natives 
and foreigners communities across countries.  
The lack of comparative research between immigrants and natives as regards the 
impact of the welfare state in the formation of social capital could possibly be remedied 
by examining the research conducted with non-immigrant population. Unfortunately 
there is also very little empirical research on how different welfare regimes may impact 
the formation of social capital of the general population. Even fewer are the studies that 
examine which welfare characteristics might be related to this variation. To complicate 
matters, the cross-national studies that do examine the role of the welfare state as 
generator of social capital have yielded mixed and even contradictory results. 
Nevertheless, and in spite of the incipient state of knowledge on the topic, it is 
still possible to identify some preliminary patterns that may guide future research. To 
review these patterns, this study will proceed systematically by answering two questions 
embedded in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 of this study:  
 
1. Does the welfare state influence the generation of social capital? If indeed there 
is such influence, does the welfare state promote or erode the formation of social capital?   
2. What welfare state characteristics are associated with variation in social 
capital? 
 
Social capital is a multifaceted concept (Bjørnskov, 2006), and authors disagree 
on how to define it (Coleman, 1988; Healy & Cote 2001; Putman, Leonardi & Nanetti, 
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1993; Serageldin & Grootaert, 2000). Despite disagreements in the conceptualization of 
social capital, most authors agree that social capital can be measured by employing at 
least two indicators: social trust and social participation.  
 
Social trust. 
Social trust is at the core of social capital and, not surprisingly, most studies 
examining the relationship between social capital and the welfare state have employed it. 
The debate on how to define and gauge social trust is not closed, and the literature offers 
an extensive variety of alternatives (Lewicki, Tomlinson & Gillespie, 2006; Nannestad, 
2008; Soroka, Helliwell & Johnston, 2006). One of the most comprehensive working 
definitions is that of Delhey and Newton (2005), who operationalize trust “as the belief 
that others will not, at worst, knowingly or willingly do you harm, and will, at best, act in 
your interest” (p.105).   
Although there is no consensus regarding the definition of social trust, scholars 
have agreed that two main types can be identified: horizontal or generalized trust (trust 
among individuals) and vertical or institutional trust (individuals’ trust in institutions). 
This study focuses on the literature which tests the impact of the welfare state on these 
two measures of social trust.  
Prior literature indicates that both generalized and institutional trust vary across 
countries and that the type of welfare state is a significant predictor of this variability 
(Crepaz, 2008; Fridberg & Kangas, 2008; Kaariainen & Lehtonen, 2006; Listhaug & 
Ringdal, 2008; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). What is not clear; however, is the pattern of 
variation across welfare regimes as well as the factors associated with these differences. 
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In 2005, Van Oorschot and Arts conducted the first systematic study to test 
whether a correlation existed between degree of welfare development and social capital 
erosion. Using the 1999-2000 wave of the European Values Survey (EVS), they 
specifically tested whether social trust varied across 23 countries divided into five 
welfare regimes. At the aggregate level, the authors found a significant and positive 
correlation between countries’ spending on social benefits and their levels of generalized 
trust and trust in institutions. Furthermore, the relationship remained significant, although 
only for generalized trust, even after controlling for countries’ income inequality. Results 
on differences in social trust among individuals were not as straightforward as the results 
between countries. Thus, while a person’s trust in institutions was positively related to a 
country’s social spending, his or her generalized trust was negatively associated with it. 
In other words, the more a country spent on social benefits, the more the citizens trusted 
the country’s institutions and the less confidence they had in people they did not know. 
These results are very interesting because simultaneously validate two competing 
hypotheses. On the one hand, results support the hypothesis that advanced welfare states 
contribute to social capital. In this case, social capital is understood as institutional trust 
and measured as trust in the following institutions: the police, the social security system, 
the health care system, the parliament and the civil service. On the other hand, results 
also validate the competing hypothesis (that generous systems erode social capital) by 
showing that social spending negatively impacts individuals’ reported generalized trust.  
Additionally, results showed that persons living in a Social-Democratic welfare 
regime reported the highest level of generalized trust, followed by persons living in the 
Liberal, Mediterranean, Conservative and Eastern regimes. However, a country’s amount 
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of social spending–a variable expected to influence social trust positively- actually 
decreased generalized trust. This result supports Esping-Andersen’s theory (1990) that 
the welfare state cannot be measured only by welfare size or welfare spending (see figure 
3 for a description of country level factors employed to examine the impact of the welfare 
state on individuals’ social trust).  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
 Regarding institutional trust, people living in the Social-Democratic regime 
reported the highest scores followed by people living in the Liberal system. The Eastern 
regime ranked last.  Compared to generalized trust outcomes, the scores for the 
Conservative regime surpassed that of the Mediterranean system.  Another difference 
between the two social trust indicators is that country’s measure for income inequality 
was not a significant predictor of individuals’ trust in institutions while it was negatively 
associated with reported generalized trust.   
 Subsequent studies conducted with a variety of datasets, countries and 
methodological designs also found the welfare state to be a significant predictor of social 
trust both at the aggregate and at the individual level.  Yet, findings were not uniform and 
the differences were not always significant. The only consistent finding is that the Social-
Democratic regime usually ranks first in terms of reported generalized trust (Crepaz, 
2008; Fridberg & Kangas, 2008; Kaariainen & Lehtonen, 2006; Listhaug & Ringdal, 
2008).  
As regards the pattern of differences across welfare regimes, studies do not report 
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a consistent pattern. Fridberg and Kangas (2008) only obtained significant results for the 
Eastern system. In Kaariainen and Lehtonen’s (2006) study the Liberal regime surpassed 
the Conservative with regards to social trust followed by the Mediterranean and Eastern 
systems. Additionally, Listhaug and Ringdal (2008) obtained mixed evidence concerning 
individuals’ trust in institutions. While there were no significant differences for both the 
Liberal and the Conservative regime, the pattern for the Mediterranean and Eastern 
systems varied depending on the measures employed.  
 Concerning quantifiable characteristics of the welfare state, studies have explored 
the impact of countries’ welfare effort (countries’ spending on social benefits) and 
welfare scope (or the proportion of total social benefits granted as means-tested versus 
non means-tested) on individuals’ reported social trust.  Social spending was a significant 
predictor of both trust in institutions and generalized trust, although not in all studies. 
Moreover, depending on the study, the direction of the impact was either positive 
(Tamilina, 2008) or negative (van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). Additionally, results illustrate 
that the larger the scope of the welfare state (i.e., the higher the proportion of non-means 
tested benefits) the higher the reported levels of social trust (Tamilina, 2008).     
Other country characteristics that have been found to impact social trust have 
been ethnic diversity, economic inequality, and unemployment rate.  Ethnic diversity has 
been associated with higher levels of distrust (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002; Anderson & 
Paskeviciute, 2006; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2007; Stolle, Soroka & Johnston, 
2008). However, Crepaz (2008) did not find countries’ percentage of foreign-born 
individuals to be a significant predictor of generalized trust in the Social-Democratic 
regime. Countries’ economic inequality negatively impacts peoples’ trust in each other 
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(Tamilina, 2008; van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). Yet only Tamilina (2008) found a 
significant effect on individuals’ trust in institutions. This finding is in line with previous 
studies which reported that income inequality erodes generalized trust (Delhey & 
Newton, 2005; Uslaner, 2002, 2003). Hall found that Britain’s unemployment rate was 
detrimental to people’s reported interpersonal trust (1999), but Tamilina’s (2008) 
outcomes did not support these results. She reported that countries’ unemployment rate 
boosted people’s trust in each other and eroded their trust in institutions.  
Past research seems to indicate that the type of welfare regime impacts people’s 
social trust. Second, it appears that more comprehensive systems foster social trust, since 
countries with a Social-Democratic regime, the most developed welfare system, 
systematically obtained the highest social trust scores. The impact of social spending in 
social trust is unclear.  One study suggested a positive influence of countries’ social 
spending in institutional trust (Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005), and in another study it did 
not emerge as a significant predictor (Tamilina, 2008). The pattern is more complicated 
for generalized trust: in one study the relationship between countries’ spending in social 
benefits had a positive influence in reported generalized trust (Tamilina, 2008) while in 
another social spending negatively impacted individuals’ confidence in each other (Van 
Oorschot & Arts, 2005).  
Welfare scope, or the amount of social spending devoted to means-tested versus 
non- means-tested benefits, is another welfare characteristic employed to test in relation 
to reported social trust. Results suggest an unequivocal pattern in terms of strength and 
direction: welfare scope was a significant predictor of both indicators of social trust. 
Furthermore, degree of universalism, or percentage of total spending devoted to non 
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means-tested benefits, increased social trust, while means-tested social spending 
decreased reported social trust (Tamilina, 2008).  
Moving on to other aggregated factors, in contrast to previous research, ethnic 
diversity was not a significant predictor of generalized trust (Crepaz, 2008).  In line with 
previous studies, economic inequality had a negative impact on generalized trust 
(Tamilina, 2008), while only one study reported a significant relationship between 
economic inequality and institutional trust (Tamilina, 2008). Another aggregated factor 
included in the analyses was countries’ unemployment rate. Results were mixed: while a 
country’s unemployment rate eroded trust in institutions, it increased people’s confidence 
in each other (Tamilina, 2008).   
Given the above results, it appears that the welfare state, in the form of universal 
access to social benefits and income parity, promotes the accumulation of social trust.  
Although that seems to be the tendency, there are at least two reasons for caution. The 
first is the limited number of studies: There is a need of more research before discussing 
trends. The second revolves around the strategies employed in analyzing data. Due to 
data limitations, the only studies that accounted for the factors mentioned above included 
all the predictors at the individual level of analysis, making it impossible to pinpoint the 
effect of welfare characteristics and country variables on social trust.  
On the basis of the above studies it seems that there is a connection between the 
Social- Democratic regime and social trust. Scholars have turned to case studies to further 
investigate this apparent pattern. Sweden has become the focus of most studies since it 
best represents the Social-Democratic regime: parity in entitlements for individuals 
embedded in a universal approach to social citizenship. Results seems to support the 
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theoretical approach which links institutional fairness (not being stigmatized as needy 
and perceived as a societal burden), and procedural justice (being treated with equal 
consideration and respect when dealing with welfare services) with higher reported levels 
of social trust (Kumlin, 2002, 2004; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein, 1998; 
Rothstein & Stolle, 2003).  
Kumlin and Rothstein (2008) employed the institutional fairness approach to test 
whether experiencing equal treatment by welfare agents decreased the trust level 
differences between first and second-generation immigrants and the native-born in 
Sweden. Results suggested that this was indeed the case. Furthermore, being treated the 
same as the native-born when dealing with welfare institutions had a particular positive 
effect on the reported generalized trust of foreign-born populations. A later study 
obtained similar results in Denmark, this time focusing on institutional trust. Immigrants 
who perceived that they were treated as natives when dealing with public institutions 
reported higher levels of trust in the Danish legal system, the police, the government and 
civil servants (Nannestad & Svendsen, 2008).  
A remarkable contribution of these studies is that they challenge the belief that 
foreign status and mistrust are irremediably linked. Furthermore, these studies show that 
the reported social trust of immigrants is not static and that the welfare state may play a 
fundamental role in promoting it.   
Despite the enormous contribution of the aforementioned case studies to the 
understanding of the relationship between welfare state and social trust, it might be too 
soon to talk about definitive theoretical mechanisms. More research is needed, 
particularly in the form of cross-national comparative studies which will assure us that 
  50 
we are not witnessing a “Nordic only” phenomenon.  
Social participation. 
Literature offers a variety of working definitions and classifications for social 
participation (for an overview, see Patulny & Svendsen, 2007). A basic understanding of 
social participation would be the extent to which individuals interact with one another. 
These interactions have been commonly classified in past literature into informal 
(contacts with family and friends) and formal (participating in civic society through 
organizational membership and/or political engagement).  
As with social trust, this study employs two questions to explore the impact of the 
welfare state on individuals’ social participation. The first question is whether the welfare 
state influences people’s daily interactions and how is the nature of the relationship. If 
indeed there is such influence, does well-developed welfare state promote or impede the 
frequency of those interactions? The second question will focus on identifying the 
characteristics associated with this potential effect.  
The first attempt to answer these questions was carried out by Scheepers, 
Grotenhuis and Gelissen in 2002. Employing data from the Eurobarometer, they 
examined the impact of welfare regimes across 13 countries on the frequency of contacts 
with family and friends by citizens 60 years of age and older. Although they found 
variance across welfare systems, their findings did not support past research regarding the 
beneficial influence of the Social-Democratic regime on social capital. They reported that 
older adults living in the Mediterranean regime had the highest amount of both contact 
with family and contact with friends. As for the rest of regimes, a consistent pattern was 
difficult to establish (see Figure 4 for a description of country level factors employed to 
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examine the impact of the welfare state on social participation of individuals).  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Additional analyses employing social security expenditure as a quantitative 
substitute for the classical qualitative welfare regime classification showed that social 
security expenditures eroded older adults’ frequency of informal social contacts.  
Although later cross-national studies including the whole population (rather than 
just the older adults) likewise found that the welfare state influenced individuals’ 
frequency of contacts with family and friends, they were unable to establish a consistent 
regime pattern (Kaariainen & Lehtonen, 2006; Van der Meer, Scheepers & Grotenhuis, 
2009; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005). 
With regards to the welfare factors associated with this variability, with the 
exception of Van Oorschot & Arts (2005), all the studies reported a negative correlation 
between countries’ expenditure in social benefits and the level of social participation. 
Discrepancies across studies might stem from the fact that Van Oorschot & Arts (2005) 
did not distinguished between country and individual-level variables to test the 
hypotheses.  
Van der Meer et al. (2009) found that the impact of social expenditures on 
peoples’ frequency of social contacts was stronger for economically disadvantaged 
groups. That is, countries’ expenditures on social benefits diminished the frequency of 
social contacts with extended family to a greater extend for people in the lowest income 
than for more economically advantaged individuals.  
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 In summary, the welfare state appears to influence individuals’ social 
participation. Unfortunately, it is not possible to establish a pattern of variation across 
regimes, the focus of the first question. Concerning the factors associated with this 
variation, it seems that social expenditures erode social participation, particularly the 
frequency of informal social contacts of economically vulnerable populations.  
 The aim of this chapter was to review past empirical research on the impact of the 
welfare state on the economic and social incorporation of immigrants. Concerning 
economic incorporation, it appears that immigrants living in countries with a Liberal 
welfare system gain access to the labor market more easily than their counterparts settled 
in countries representative of other regimes. What is not clear, however, is whether 
market participation translates into economic incorporation for immigrants across 
regimes; it is also not clear what factors can account for the variation across regimes. 
Further research should examine the ability of the welfare state to compensate foreigners 
for the economic hardship associated with settling in a new country (discrimination, lack 
of human and social capital, segmented markets, etc.).   
 Very few studies have explored the impact of the welfare state on immigrants’ 
social incorporation. Prior literature examining the impact of the welfare state on social 
capital for the entire population indicates that both generalized and institutional trust vary 
across welfare regimes. What is not clear, however, is the pattern of variability that the 
welfare regimes follow or the factors associated with this variability. In addition, no 
study has examined whether the welfare system impacts differently the reported social 
capital of foreign and native populations across countries representative of different 
welfare regimes. 
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Significance of the Study 
 Prior literature denotes that there are several topics on the welfare state-immigrant 
incorporation relationship that deserve further attention. 
 First, despite the importance of the welfare state as a potential mechanism for the 
incorporation of newcomers, little research has been conducted which investigates its 
ability to compensate for the disadvantages faced by a foreign-born population when 
settling in a new country.  Most previous research testing the relationship between the 
welfare state and the economic incorporation of immigrants has focused on work-related 
indicators such as income, unemployment or occupational status. Two limitations stem 
from this approach. The first is that foreign-born individuals present unique 
characteristics (limited proficiency in the host country’s language, difficulties with 
having their employment qualifications recognized, and discrimination problems), which 
situate them at a disadvantage in competing with the native- born population in the labor 
market of recipient societies. Thus, countries with flexible markets and a high demand for 
unskilled labor might seem more favorable for the economic incorporation of immigrants. 
However, this approach is based on the assumption that degree of labor market 
participation leads to better economic incorporation outcomes for foreign-born 
population. The origin of the welfare state is founded in the idea that a redistribution 
mechanism was needed to compensate vulnerable populations for the inequalities 
stemming from participating in liberal markets. Foreign-born individuals might 
participate more in the market of countries with Liberal welfare systems than in countries 
with more generous systems of social protection. However, comprehensive welfare 
regimes may compensate better than residual systems of protection for the challenges 
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faced when settling in a new country. This perspective has not been addressed in past 
literature from a comparative multilevel approach.  
 Second, little attention has been paid to the relationship between the welfare state 
and the social incorporation of immigrants. Only a handful of studies have investigated 
the role of the welfare state in the reported social capital of foreign-born individuals. 
Furthermore, past literature share the peculiarity of having been conducted in countries 
representative of the Social-Democratic welfare regime. However, the relationship 
between the welfare state and social capital among foreign-born communities has not 
been explored in a comparative setting encompassing a wider categorization of welfare 
regimes and countries.  
 Third, despite the increasing popularity of multilevel designs this approach has 
not been yet fully incorporated in the study of the welfare state in relation to immigrants’ 
incorporation into host societies. Only a handful of studies have employed multilevel 
design to test the welfare state’s impact on the economic incorporation of immigrants, 
and no study has been conducted to date that employs this design to analyze social 
incorporation outcomes. Failing to investigate the impact of welfare state characteristics 
separately from the characteristics of individuals can result in either atomistic fallacy or 
in ecological fallacy. Atomistic fallacy occurs when drawing inferences about the 
variability of higher level units (i.e. countries) based on information collected at a lower 
level (i.e. citizens) (Diez-Roux, 2002). The opposite is true for ecological fallacy. 
Ecological fallacy occurs when relationships observed at the aggregate level (i.e. 
countries) are employed to reach conclusions about relationships happening among lower 
units of analyses (i.e. individuals) (Freedman, 2004).  
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Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 
This study aims (1) to examine the influence of different welfare regimes on the 
economic and social incorporation of foreign-born individuals, and (2) to investigate 
whether characteristics of the welfare state such as welfare effort and welfare scope 
(proportion of means-tested versus non-means tested benefits) are associated with the 
economic and social incorporation of foreign-born individuals across welfare regimes. 
Based on past research, the following research questions and hypotheses are formulated. 
 
Research Question 1: Does the welfare state influence the economic 
incorporation of foreign-born individuals?  
Past literature seems to indicate that the welfare state impacts immigrants’ 
opportunities to access the labor market of recipient societies. Specifically, prior studies 
indicate that immigrants fined employment more easily, earn higher incomes, and attain 
higher occupational status in countries representative of the Liberal welfare regime 
(Fleischmann & Dronkers, 2007; Kogan, 2003, 2007; Lewin-Epstein et al., 2003; Wanner 
& Dronkers, 2005).  
With regards the redistributive role of the welfare state, in Sweden, the archetype 
of the Social-Democratic regime, immigrants and natives seem to attain equivalent 
outcomes on their ability to overcome poverty (Morrissens & Sainsbury, 2005).  
Based on past research, the following testable hypotheses related to the first 
research question are developed: 
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• Hypothesis 1. The welfare state will influence individuals’ economic well-being.   
• Hypothesis 2. Individuals’ will make ends meet more easily if living in countries 
under the Scandinavian regime than if living in countries under other welfare 
regimes. 
• Hypothesis 3. The gap in the economic well-being of immigrants and native-born 
individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian welfare regime than 
in countries with other regimes. 
 
Research Question 2: What characteristics of the welfare state correlate with the 
economic well-being of immigrants? 
Concerning the ability of the welfare state to compensate vulnerable populations 
for the inequalities stemming from participating in liberal markets, prior literature only 
partially supports the welfare regime theory for immigrant populations. Apparently social 
spending does not influence immigrants’ income (Wanner & Dronkers, 2005), and only 
in Sweden do immigrants and natives report similar outcomes regarding the impact of 
social transfers on their likelihood to live above poverty (Morrissens & Sainsbury, 2005). 
Nevertheless, researchers acknowledged difficulties in finding comparable data for 
conducting cross-national comparisons of native and foreign-born populations and 
presented their outcomes as tentative.  
Based on past research, the following testable hypotheses related to the second 
research question are developed: 
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• Hypothesis 4: Country’s amount of social spending will increase individuals’ 
economic well-being. 
• Hypothesis 5: Individuals’ economic well-being will increase more as a result of 
country’s spending on non-means-tested benefits than as a result of countries’ 
spending on means-tested benefits. 
 
Research Question 3: Does the welfare state influence the reported social 
capital of foreign-born individuals?  
Research indicates that immigrants report lower levels of social capital than 
natives (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Coffé & Geys, 2007; Cheong et al., 2007; Putnam, 
2007). Although not study has been conducted that examines the influence of the welfare 
state on the reported social capital of foreign-born populations across countries; past 
scholars seem to agree on the positive influence of the Social-Democratic regime on the 
social trust levels of the general population (Crepaz, 2008; Fridberg & Kangas, 2008; 
Kaariainen & Lehtonen, 2006; Tamilina, 2008; van Oorschot & Arts, 2005).  
Concerning the influence of the welfare state on the social participation of the 
general population, it seems that the Mediterranean regime exerts a stronger influence 
than other regimes on the frequency of social contacts of older adults (Scheepers et al., 
2002). Including the entire population in the analyses, however, yields to the Social-
Democratic regime prevailing among other systems concerning individuals’ social 
participation (Kaariainen & Lehtonen, 2006).  
Based on past research, the following testable hypotheses related to the third 
research question are developed: 
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• Hypothesis 6. The welfare state will influence individuals’ reported generalized 
trust.  
• Hypothesis 7. The welfare state will influence individuals’ reported trust in 
institutions. 
• Hypothesis 8. The welfare state will influence individuals’ frequency of informal 
social contacts.  
• Hypothesis 9. Individuals in the Scandinavian regime will report higher levels of 
generalized trust than individuals in other welfare regimes.  
• Hypothesis 10. Individuals in the Scandinavian regime will report higher levels of 
trust institutions than individuals in other welfare regimes. 
• Hypothesis 11. Individuals in the Scandinavian regime will meet more often with 
family and friends than individuals in other welfare regimes. 
• Hypothesis 12. The gap in generalized trust between immigrants and native-born 
individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian welfare regime than 
in countries with other regimes. 
• Hypothesis 13. The gap in trust in institutions between immigrants and native-
born individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian welfare regime 
than in countries with other regimes. 
• Hypothesis 14. The gap in frequency of socialization between immigrants and 
native-born individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian welfare 
regime than in countries with other regimes. 
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Research Question 4: What characteristics of the welfare state correlate with the 
reported social capital of immigrants? 
No cross-comparative research has tested the influence of characteristics of the 
welfare state on the social capital of foreign-born populations. In addition, results from 
past research on the impact of social spending on the social trust (Tamilina, 2008; Van 
Oorschot & Arts, 2005) and the social participation (Scheepers et al., 2002; Van der Meer 
et al., 2009; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005) of the general population have been 
inconclusive. 
Concerning the impact of the scope of the welfare state on immigrants’ reported 
social capital studies conducted in Sweden and Denmark illustrate that degree of 
universalism influence positively. In both countries immigrants who were exposed to 
universal welfare programs reported higher levels of social trust than counterparts who 
dealt with means-tested social services (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2008; Nannestad et al., 
2008). Additionally, social spending in non-means tested benefits seems to increase 
social trust while social spending in means-tested benefits seems to erode it peoples’ 
reported social trust (Tamilina, 2008).  
 
Based on past research, the following testable hypotheses related to the fourth 
research question are developed: 
 
• Hypothesis 15. Country’s amount of social spending will increase individuals’ 
reported social trust. 
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• Hypothesis 16. Country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits will increase 
individuals’ reported generalized trust while country’s spending in means-tested 
benefits will decrease it. 
• Hypothesis 17. Country’s amount of social spending will increase individuals’ 
reported trust in institutions. 
• Hypothesis 18. Country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits will increase 
individuals’ reported institutional trust while country’s spending in means-tested 
benefits will decrease it. 
• Hypothesis 19. Country’s amount of social spending will increase individuals’ 
frequency of informal social contacts. 
• Hypothesis 20. Country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits will increase 
individuals’ frequency of informal social contacts while country’s spending in 
means-tested benefits will decrease it. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Methods 
 
This chapter deals with the methodological portion of the study. It is comprised of 
four sections. The first section describes the data sources employed, the European Social 
Survey (ESS) and the European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
(ESSPROS). The second section describes the sample and the weights applied to the 
survey data. The third section describes the measures employed: dependent variables, 
independent variables, individual- level control variables and country-level control 
variables. The last section is devoted to the data analysis plan and describes the strategy 
followed to answer the research questions.  
 
Data 
 Two sources of data are employed in this dissertation research. The first one, the 
European Social Survey (ESS), is used to measure individuals’ economic and social 
incorporation outcomes. The second source of data, the European System of Integrated 
Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS), is utilized to measure the characteristics of the 
welfare state.  
 
The European Social Survey (ESS). 
The ESS is an academically driven social survey specifically designed to assure 
dependable comparisons across European countries. It is considered among the most 
rigorous and reliable sources of data to investigate social change in European societies. In 
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2005 it was awarded Europe’s top annual science award, the Descartes prize. The ESS 
collects biannually cross-sectional data covering more than 30 nations. The first round 
was conducted in 2002, followed by two more rounds in 2004 and 2006 respectively.  
Data gathering for the fourth round started at the end of 2008 and is still in progress. This 
study employs combined data from the first three rounds of the ESS. The rationale behind 
pooling the three first waves is to increase the sample size of the foreign-born population 
and therefore the power of the test. Small samples can lead to type I error (rejecting a null 
hypothesis when it is true). Consequently, the larger the samples size the greater the 
likelihood of finding “true” differences in the population (correctly accepting the 
alternative hypothesis) (Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer & Tourangeau, 
2009, p.104).  To conduct the analyses I generated three dummy variables, one for each 
survey year, to control for the potential influence of the year in which the data was 
collected.  
The ESS collects data on a variety of topics. The main questionnaire encompasses 
342 variables designed to measure peoples’ trust in institutions, political engagement, 
socio-political values, moral and social values, social capital, social exclusion, national, 
ethnic and religious identity, well-being, health and security, demographic composition, 
education and occupation, socioeconomic characteristics, and household characteristics.  
From a methodological perspective, the main goals of the ESS are the ‘optimal 
comparability’ of data across European nations and country representativeness. To gather 
functionally equivalent data, a centralized team of experts oversees the entire process: the 
design of the source questionnaire, its translation to the languages needed at the national 
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level, the data collection procedures, and the data coding. Data collection occurs by 
means of face-to-face, one-hour interviews, in the respondent’s native language.  
Two strategies are employed to attain country representativeness. The first one 
involves drawing national probability samples with comparable estimates based on full 
coverage of the population aged 15 and over. Even though the actual method of achieving 
this requirement varies across participating countries, a centralized panel of experts 
guarantees that each country’s sample is based on the same basic principles of probability 
sampling and representativeness. The second strategy to ensure country 
representativeness is aiming for a high response rate, at least 70 percent in each 
participating country.  
 
The European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics (ESSPROS) 
 
The ESSPROS, maintained by the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(Eurostat), is a harmonized system of data on expenditures on social protection schemes. 
Its aim is to provide comparable statistics across 30 European nations to analyze financial 
flows of resources directed at social protection. Data are gathered on annual basis and 
covers the period 1997-2005.  
ESSPROS collects data on countries’ social protection benefits. Social protection 
benefits are understood as “all interventions from public or private bodies intended to 
relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set of risk or needs, 
provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an individual arrangement 
involved” (ESSPROS, 2008, p. 9).  
Social protection benefits are classified and harmonized by their function. The 
functions employed in this study are: sickness/health care, disability, old age, survivors, 
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family/children, unemployment, housing, and social exclusion not classified elsewhere 
(ESSPROS, 2008, pp. 43-61).  
 
• The sickness/health care function covers both comprehensive medical care and 
benefits to replace loss of earnings during unemployment periods due to sickness 
or injury.  
• The disability function provides: a) an income to persons who lost the ability to 
work due to physical or mental disability, b) rehabilitation services required by 
disabilities, c) goods and services other than medical care.  
• The old age function covers pension benefits and goods and services specifically 
designed for the elderly. It excludes medical benefits specific to old age because 
these are reported under the sickness/health care function.  
• The survivor function provides: a) an income to families which lost primary 
breadwinners, b) funeral costs and c) goods and services to survivors.  
• The family/children function includes both financial support and social services 
for rearing children and for the support of relatives.  
• The unemployment function compensates for lost income due to unemployment 
and covers the expenses of training the unemployed.  
• The housing function helps households to meet the cost of housing including rent 
and mortgage.  
• The social exclusion not elsewhere classified function covers ad-hoc interventions 
to target populations particularly at risk of social exclusion such as: victims of 
natural disasters, victims of criminal violence, drug or alcohol addicts, etc. 
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Sample 
 This study utilizes a probability sample of 111,386 males and females between 15 
and 90 years old residing in 24 European countries. The sample is further divided into 
105,214 native-born people and 6,172 non-European immigrants (foreign-born 
individuals migrating from countries outside the European Union) (see Table 1 for an 
overview of sample sizes by country).  
 
[Table 1 about here]  
 The data were extracted from the cumulative ESS file. The cumulative ESS file 
includes all countries that have participated in at least two of the three survey rounds 
conducted between 2002 and 2006. The total number of countries included in the 
cumulative ESS file is 24:  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and Ukraine (see Figure 5 for an overview of participating countries by ESS 
round).  
 
[Figure 5 about here]  
 
 Survey weights.  
 It is necessary to employ weights with survey data. Weighting creates a sample 
which “truly” represents a particular population. Weights, therefore, correct for over- or 
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under- representation of certain groups in the sample. The ESS employs design weights 
to correct for differences in probability of selection, that is, for the fact that not all 
individuals aged 15 and over were given the same chance of being sampled (ESS, 2009). 
This study employs design weights throughout all data management and analyses.   
 
Measures 
 This study employs measures at two different levels, individual-level and country-
level. The measures for the dependent variables are the individual-level; while predictor 
and control variables include measures at both, individual and country levels (see Figure 
6 for an overview of the variables included in the study).  
 
[Figure 6 about here]  
 
Dependent variables. 
 Four variables measure immigrants’ economic and social incorporation. One 
variable measures economic incorporation, two different variables determine 
respondents’ reported social trust, and the remaining variable gauges social participation. 
The statistical software Stata 11 is employed for data management.  
 
Economic incorporation.  
To gauge economic incorporation I employed the responses to the question 
“Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel (‘describe’, ‘view’ 
or ‘see’) about your household’s income?” 1= living comfortably on present income, 2= 
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coping on present income, 3= difficult on present income, 4=very difficult on present 
income.  
Data for this variable is omitted from the cumulative file for France (rounds 1 and 
2) because its coding does not correspond with ESS standards and because it has an 
additional category.  To recover this variable for France, I proceed in two steps. In the 
first step I recoded the two missing variables into ESS standards. In the second step I 
merged the two variables into the original cumulative file. To recode the missing 
variables into the ESS standards I employed the following equivalences. The French 
variable categories 1= on vit très confortablement (we live well with our income) and 2= 
on vit assez confortablement (we live quite well with our income) correspond to the ESS 
category 1= living comfortably on present income. The French variable category 3= on 
arrive à s'en sortir (we manage/we can cope with our income) corresponds to the ESS 
category 2= coping on present income of the ESS standard. The French variable category 
4= on a du mal à s'en sortir (we find it hard to manage with our income) corresponds to 
the EES category 3= difficult on present income. Finally, the French variable category 5= 
on ne s'en sort vraiment pas (we really can't manage with our income) corresponds to the 
ESS category 4= very difficult on present income. In an additional step, I reversed the 
coding of the variable Feeling about household income into an ascending order (1= very 
difficult on present income, 2=difficult on present income, 3=copying on present income, 
4=living comfortably in present income). The amount of missing data for the variable 
Feeling about household income is 1,676 cases corresponding to (1.34%) of the total 
sample.  
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Social incorporation. 
Social trust. 
 I created to variables to measure social trust, generalized trust and trust in 
institutions. To create generalized trust I generated an additive scale composed of three 
variables ranging from 0=least trusting attitudes to 10=most trusting attitudes. The three 
variables contained in the scale correspond to the following questions: 1-“Would your 
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” (ppltrst)  2-“Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if 
they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” (pplfair) and 3- “Would you say that 
most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for 
themselves?” (pplhlp). 
  Before generating the combined scale, I assigned the value of the mean to 
observations coded as ‘don’t know’ in the original variables. The rationale is that in a 
scale ranging from 0 to 10 people classified as don’t know are equivalent (in content) to 
the population average. The variable (ppltrst) contained 488 (0.40%) cases classified as 
don’t know. The variable (pplfair) contained 1,113 (0.90%) classified as don’t know.  
The variable (pplhlp) contained 660 (0.54%) cases classified as don’t know.   
The scale for generalized trust ranges from 0 to 30. The scale obtained an alpha of 
0.765. In addition, I conducted principal-components factor analysis with varimax 
rotation to test the pattern of relationships among the variables. I obtained a single factor 
with an eigenvalue of 2.043. The amount of missing data for the variable Generalized 
trust is 1,707 cases corresponding to (1.37%) of the total sample.  
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To create the trust in institutions variable I also generated an additive scale 
composed of three variables ranging from 0=not trust at all to 10=complete trust. The 
three variables contained in the scale corresponded to the following question: “Using this 
card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out” 1= country’s parliament (trstprl); 2= country’s legal system 
(trstlgl) and 3= country’s police (trstplc). 
Similar to the generalized trust scale, I substituted the answers classified as don’t 
know with the mean values of each of the variables.  The variable (trstprl) contained 
4,035 (3.28 %) classified as don’t know. The variable (trstlgl) contained 3,537 (2.87%) 
cases classified as don’t know.  The variable (trstplc) contained 1,569 (1.27%) cases 
classified as don’t know.   
The trust in institutions scale ranged from 0 to 30. The scale obtained an alpha of 
0.796. In addition, I conducted principal-components factor analysis with varimax 
rotation to test the pattern of relationships among the variables. I obtained a single factor 
with an eigenvalue of 2.133. The amount of missing data for the variable Trust in 
institutions is 1,818 cases corresponding to (1.46%) of the total sample. 
 
Social participation. 
 To gauge individuals’ social participation I employed the answers to the 
following question: “Using this card, how often do you meet socially (“meet socially” 
implies meet by choice rather than for reasons or either work or pure duty) with friends, 
relatives or work colleagues?” 1= never, 2= less than once a month, 3= once a month, 4= 
several times a month, 5= once a week, 6= several times a week, 7= every day. I recoded 
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this variable into a pseudo-continuous variable as follows: never= 0, less than once a 
month= 0.5, once a month= 1, several times a month= 3, once a week= 4, several times a 
week= 12, every day=30.  The amount of missing data for the variable Frequency of 
informal social contacts is 1,885 cases corresponding to (1.51%) of the total sample. 
   
Independent variables. 
 Individual-level independent variables. 
 Foreign-born is a dichotomous variable which classifies individuals born in the 
country where the interview was conducted as 0 and foreign-born individuals coming 
from non-European Union countries as 1. I excluded from the sample native-born 
individuals born from one or both foreign-born parents (second generation immigrants). 
In addition, I excluded from the sample foreign-born respondents coming from countries 
within the European Union. I also excluded for the sample four cases which contained 
unreliable information. Specifically, one person was interviewed in Denmark and 
classified as native-born but Australia his/her country of birth. Another person also 
interviewed in Denmark and classified as native-born reported Macedonia as country of 
birth. The third person omitted from the sample was a native-born from Slovenia who 
indicated Sierra Leona as country of birth. The fourth person omitted from the sample 
was also a native of Slovenia who indicated Bosnia & Herzegovina as country of birth. It 
could be argued that the omitted cases could have been considered native-born if 
citizenship was granted following “jus sanguinis” (citizenship is granted on basis of 
parents’ citizenship instead than on basis of country of birth). This study does not include 
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this type of information and an individual is considered an immigrant if born in a 
different country from the country of residency.  
Countries adhesion to the European Union occurred gradually. To account for this 
fact in classifying immigrants as Europeans/non-Europeans I controlled for year of 
interview. For instance, citizens from countries that joined the European Union before the 
year 2002 (the year when the first wave of data was collected) and were living in a 
country different from where they were born were all categorized as EU immigrants and 
omitted from the final sample. However, citizens from countries that joined the European 
Union during the process of data collection and were living in a country different from 
where they were born were classified as EU immigrants only for the waves in which their 
countries belonged to the European Union. An example would be citizens from Estonia 
living in other countries. Estonia joined the European Union in the year 2004. Hence, 
Estonians living in other countries in during the 2002 data collection process were 
classified as non-EU immigrants, while Estonians living in other countries in 2004 and 
2006 were coded as EU immigrants and therefore omitted from the final sample.   
Country-level independent variables. 
The country level independent variable is the welfare state. To measure welfare 
state I created one qualitative variable and two quantitative variables.  
 The qualitative measure of the welfare state includes five dummy variables, one 
for each welfare regime: Scandinavian, Bismarckian, Anglo-Saxon, Southern and 
Eastern. The Anglo-Saxon regime includes the United Kingdom and Ireland. The 
Bismarckian regime includes: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland. The Scandinavian regime comprises: Denmark, Finland, 
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Norway and Sweden. The Southern regime encompasses Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. The Eastern regime consists of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine (see Figure 1 for an overview).   
 The quantitative measures for the welfare state are welfare effort and welfare 
scope. I accounted for welfare effort employing the average of countries’ expenditure in 
social protection benefits as a percentage of their GDP (ESSPROS, 2008). To better 
gauge the impact of social protection expenditure on individual outcomes, I employed the 
years directly preceding the ESS data collection waves (2001, 2003 and 2005). A 
limitation of ESSPROS is that it does not include expenditure on education as part of 
social protection benefits. To account for this limitation I created the variable Welfare 
effort which comprised countries’ expenditure on social protection benefits as percentage 
of GDP plus countries’ expenditure in education as percentage of GDP. 
 To measure Welfare scope, I employed two variables, countries’ expenditure in 
means-tested social benefits as percentage of GDP and countries’ expenditure in non-
means-tested social benefits as percentage of GDP. Means-tested benefits account for 
expenditures on benefits explicitly or implicitly conditional on the beneficiary’s income 
and/or wealth falling below a specified level. Non-means tested benefits include 
expenditures distributed despite of poverty level. There is not harmonized data in welfare 
scope and welfare expenditure for Ukraine. As a result I eliminate Ukraine from the 
sample. Consequently, I employed 24 countries to conduct the analyses for the welfare 
regime dummy variables and 23 countries for the analyses concerning welfare effort and 
welfare scope.  
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Control variables. 
Individual-level control variables. 
 At the individual-level, this study includes demographic and socio-economic 
control variables.  
Demographic control variables. 
The demographic control variables are age, age squared, gender, partnered, 
residential parent, and rural area.  
To create the variable age I subtracted the year in which a respondent was 
interviewed from his/her year of birth. Age ranged from 15 to 110 years. To avoid outlier 
observations, I recoded respondents 91 years and older to the age 90 (0.23% of the total 
sample). The amount of missing data for the variable Age is 2,341 cases corresponding to 
(1.94 %) of the total sample.  
I generated Age squared in two steps. In the first step I created a variable by 
mean-centering age. In the second step I squared the mean-centered variable to generate 
age squared.   
Gender is a dichotomous variable where females are classified as 0 and males are 
classified as 1. The amount of missing data for the variable Gender is 211 cases 
corresponding to (0.17 %) of the total sample. 
Partnered is a dummy variable in which I classified individuals who reported that 
were living with a husband, a wife or a partner as 1. I classified the rest of the sample as 
0. The amount of missing data for the variable Partnered is 992 cases corresponding to 
(0.82 %) of the total sample. 
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I generated Residential parent or number of respondents’ children living in the 
household using household roster data, and more specifically, the variables inquiring 
about each person’s in the household relationship to the respondent. The residential 
parent variable reflects respondents’ number of sons, daughters, stepchildren, adopted 
and fosters children, and ranges from 0 to 10 children. This variable was highly skewed 
since most respondents reported none or only one child living in the household. As a 
result, I transformed residential parent into a dichotomous variable were I classified as 0 
childless respondents and 1 those individuals with any number of children living in the 
household. The amount of missing data for the variable Residential parent is 1,174 cases 
corresponding to (0.97 %) of the total sample. 
The variable Rural area accounts for whether respondent lives in the countryside. 
To create the rural area variable I employed the question: “Which phrase on this card best 
describes the area where you live?: 1-= a big city; 2-= the suburbs or outskirts of a big 
city; 3-= a town or a small city; 4= a country village; 5= a farm or home in the 
countryside. I classified as 0 individuals who reported living in a big city, in the suburbs 
or outskirts of a big city or in a small city. I classified as 1 respondents living in a country 
village or in a farm or home in the countryside. The amount of missing data for the 
variable Rural area is 396 cases corresponding to (0.33 %) of the total sample. 
Socioeconomic control variables. 
The socioeconomic control variables are education, employed, unemployed and 
inactive.   
The education variables captures the answers to the question “How many years of 
full-time education have you completed?” The original variable ranged from 0 to 56. 
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Only 0.16% of the sample had more than 25 years of education. Therefore I reclassified 
that percentage of the sample as having 25 years of education or over. The amount of 
missing data for the variable Education is 1,581 cases corresponding to (1.31 %) of the 
total sample. 
To account for respondents’ labor market status I created three dummy variables: 
employed, unemployed and inactive, using the answers from the following question: 
“Which of the description of this card best describes your situation (in the last seven 
days?).” I classified as employed respondents who responded paid work (or away 
temporarily) (employee, self-employed, working for your family business). I classified as 
unemployed people who reported: a= unemployed and actively looking for a job and b= 
unemployed, wanting a job but not actively looking for a job. Finally, I classified as 
inactive people who reported: a= in education, even if on vacation (not paid for by 
employer), b= permanently sick or disabled, c= retired, d= in community or military 
service, e= doing housework, looking after children or other persons, f=other. The 
amount of missing data for these variables is 947 cases corresponding to (0.79 %) of the 
total sample. 
Country-level control variables. 
I generated country percentage of immigrants by aggregating individual-level data 
on migratory status. Percentage of immigrants reflects countries’ percentage population 
that is comprised by non-EU immigrants.  
I gauge both native-born and foreign-born unemployment rate employing data 
from the Labor Force Survey of the European Commission Statistics (Eurostat) on 
countries’ unemployment rate by nationality (Eurostat, 2009). The Labor Force Survey 
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collects quarterly data on total unemployment rate distinguishing between national and 
citizens of countries outside the European Union.  
To measure markets’ degree of flexibility I used the Employment Protection 
Legislation index (EPL), which ranges from 0 to 6. The EPL was originally developed by 
the OECD in 1992. It reflects “both the regulations concerning hiring (e.g., rules favoring 
disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, training 
requirements) and firing (e.g., redundancy procedures, mandated prenotification periods 
and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and short-time 
work schemes)” (OECD, 2009). The OECD does not calculate the EPL index for Estonia, 
Luxembourg and Slovenia, and there are not alternative sources that I could use to 
replace the missing data. To generate data for these I employed the rationale of the 
theoretical model proposed for this study which classifies welfare regimes into two 
systems: regimes with generous social provisions and highly protected labor markets and 
regimes with residual social provisions and fairly open labor markets (Engelen, 2003; 
Faist, 1996; Rueda & Pontusson, 2000). Hence I replaced the missing information for the 
EPL index of Estonia and Slovenia, countries belonging to the Eastern cluster, with the 
average EPL index of the remaining countries within this cluster: Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Likewise, I replaced the missing information for 
Luxembourg employing the average EPL indexes of the Bismarckian cluster: Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland.   
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Data Analysis Plan 
The nested structure of the data (individuals within countries) warrants the use of 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) to conduct the analyses. HLM accounts for 
dependency of observations (for instance, citizens from a given country share certain 
characteristics that make them more homogeneous than if the sample was drawn 
randomly across countries). Additionally, HLM allows examining the influence of 
contextual factors (welfare state) on the variability of individual outcomes (Raudenbush 
& Bryk, 2002). Given the limited number of countries in the sample I conducted the 
analyses employing restricted maximum likelihood.  
The modeling strategy proceeds as follows (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002):  
 
Model 0. One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
This model is estimated to evaluate the need for hierarchical modeling. The goal 
of this preliminary model is to assess how much of the variance in the outcome variable 
occurs within-countries and how much happens between-countries. In practical terms, the 
null model is equivalent to one-way ANOVA test. Only significant between-group 
variation warrants the use of hierarchical modeling.   
 
ijjij rDV ++= 000 µ!  
 
ijDV indicates the outcome variable for a particular individual within a particular country 
00
!   indicates the average grand mean for the outcome variable.  
j0
µ  indicates the residual variability between countries.  
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ij
r    indicates the residual variability within countries.  
 
Model 1. Random coefficients regression model.  
The purpose of this model is to describe the effect of individuals’ migratory status 
on the variability of outcomes. 
ijijjjijij rimmigimmigDV ++++= )()( 101000 µµ!!  
ijDV  indicates the outcome variable for a particular individual within a particular country  
00
!    is the average intercept across the level-2 units.   
10
!    is the average regression slope across the level-2 units.  
j0
µ  is the unique increment to the intercept associated with level-2 unit j. 
j1
µ  is the unique increment to the slope associated with level-2 unit j. 
ij
r  indicates the residual variability within countries. 
 
Model 2. Intercepts- and Slopes-as-Outcomes  
This model evaluates the impact of different welfare regimes on the variability of 
the outcomes. This model estimates the effect of the level-1 variables as dependent upon 
the value of the country-level predictors (more specifically, the welfare regime dummy 
variables).  
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ijDV  indicates the outcome variable for a particular individual within a particular country  
00
!    is the average intercept across the level-2 units. 
1!k
" indicates the average for each of the welfare regime variables across countries  
10
!    is the average regression slope across the level-2 units.  
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12 !k
"  represents the coefficient for the cross-level interaction between each group and 
welfare regime.  
j0
µ  is the unique increment to the intercept associated with level-2 unit j. 
j1
µ  is the unique increment to the slope associated with level-2 unit j. 
ij
r  indicates the residual variability within countries. 
 
The data analysis strategy involves conducted the models controlling for 
individual and country level characteristics for each outcome variable. Therefore in this 
study a total of (7 models*3 welfare variables*4 outcome variables) = 84 models will be 
conducted as follows: 
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model. 
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes. 
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual- level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual- level variables + 
percentage of immigrants in country.  
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual-level variables + 
native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual-level variables + 
foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual-level variables + 
countries’ Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Results 
 
 
 This chapter presents the results to the research questions and hypotheses 
introduced in the second chapter of this study. The first section describes the sample and 
provides an overview of country characteristics. The second section deals with the impact 
of the welfare state on the economic incorporation of immigrants into recipient societies. 
The third section focuses on the impact of the welfare state on the social incorporation of 
foreign-born population.  
 
Descriptives 
 Estimates in table 2 show that immigrants have more difficulties to make ends 
meet (35%) than their native counterparts (22%).  Immigrants report lower average levels 
of generalized trust (14.99) than their native peers (15.55) and they also socialize less 
often (9.85) than do corresponding native-born individuals (10.04). However, immigrants 
report higher levels of trust in institutions (16.45) than their native counterparts (15.86).  
 As regards the sample, immigrants are slightly younger, more likely to be 
partnered and to have dependant children living with them in the household than their 
native counterparts. Additionally, immigrants have more years of education completed 
and are more likely to be employed than their native counterparts. Immigrants are also 
more often unemployed than are their native peers (see Table 2 for an overview of 
descriptive statistics on individual-level variables). 
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[Table 2 about here]. 
Concerning country-level characteristics, Estonia hosts the largest number of 
foreign-born individuals (10.76%) closely followed by Germany (9.28%). The largest 
rate of native unemployment is in Slovakia (16.46%) followed by Spain (10.03%), while 
Belgium registers the largest rate of immigrant unemployment (34.5%). Great Britain and 
Ireland have the most flexible labor markets while Southern European countries like 
Portugal, Spain and Greece have the most protective (see Table 3 for an overview of 
descriptive statistics on country-level variables). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The Welfare State as Agent of Immigrants’ Economic Incorporation 
 
This section presents the results for the first research question of this study: Does 
the welfare state influence the economic incorporation of foreign-born individuals?  
Results for the impact of the welfare state on immigrants’ ability to live on their 
income, as compared to the native-born, are presented in table 4. 
 
[Table 4 about here]  
 
In model 0, the significant estimate for the variance of the intercept (b= 1.22, p< 
0.001) indicates that there is significant variability in individuals’ ability to live on their 
income across countries, which suggests the need of hierarchical modeling to answer the 
research question.  
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The coefficient for the fixed effect (b=-3.28, p<0.001) is the log odds of the 
probability of belonging to category 1 (very difficult to live on present income). The 
following formula can be employed to transform log odds into probabilities 
p=
! 
e
" 00
/(1+ e
" 00
) . Therefore, the average likelihood of having serious difficulties to live on 
present income is 0.035 (3.5%). Adding threshold 2 gives the probability of being in 
categories 1 (very difficult to live on present income) or 2 (difficult on present income). 
For model 0: p=exp (-3.28+1.83)/1+exp (-3.28+1.83) = 0.19. Hence, on average 19% of 
the population across European countries struggle to make ends meet. Adding threshold 3 
gives the probability of being in categories 1 (very difficult to live on present income) or 
2 (difficult on present income) or 3 (coping with present income). For model 0: p=exp (-
3.28+4.28)/1+exp (-3.28+4.28) = 0.73. Therefore, on average (0.73-0.19) = 0.54 (54%) 
of the population are able to make ends meet and (1-0.73) = 0. 27 (27%) live comfortably 
on their income.  
Model 1, investigates the impact of migratory status (native-born versus foreign-
born) on individuals’ ability to live on their income. Applying the above formulas, the 
estimate for the native born population (b=-3.35, p< 0.001) indicate that, on average, 
18% of natives struggle to make ends meet, 54% cope with their income and 28% live 
comfortable on their income. In contrast, the estimate for the foreign-born population (-
3.35+0.68) =-2.67 indicates that 30% of immigrants struggle to make ends meet, 53% 
cope with their income and 17% live comfortable on their income.  
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Hypothesis 1: The welfare state will influence individuals’ economic well-
being.  
Table 4 shows that including the welfare regime variables in model 2 helps to 
explain 57% of the total variance in individuals’ ability to make ends meet across 
countries.  Adding different country-level control variables in subsequent models does 
not increase substantially the explanatory power of the welfare regime on individuals’ 
economic well-being. Additionally, most of the variability on individuals’ generalized 
trust occurs between countries. Results support hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Individuals’ will make ends meet more easily if living in 
countries under the Scandinavian regime than if living in countries under 
other welfare regimes. 
Coefficients for model 2 in table 4 indicate that on average, 8% of native-born 
individuals living in countries under the Scandinavian regime struggle to live on their 
income, 42% make ends meet and 50% live comfortably with it. Native-born individuals 
living in other welfare regimes have more difficulties to live on their income than their 
Scandinavian counterparts. The smallest gap on natives’ ability to live on their income 
occurs between the Scandinavian and the Bismarckian regimes (b= 0.14, p=n.s.) closely 
followed by the Anglo-Saxon regime (b= 0.28, p=n.s.), although the differences are not 
significant in the population. Conversely, the largest difference on natives’ ability to live 
on their income occurs between the Scandinavian and the Eastern regime (b= 2.16, p< 
0.001), followed by the Southern regime (b= 1.47, p< 0.05). Controlling for individual 
characteristics in model 3 reduces the gap in individuals’ ability to make ends meet 
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among regimes. Including countries’ control variables in subsequent models does not 
contribute substantially to the explanatory power of the model.  
 Unlike their native counterparts, model 2 shows that foreign-born individuals do 
not make ends meet more easily if living in countries with a Scandinavian welfare 
regime. Actually, immigrants make ends meet more easily if living in countries with an 
Anglo-Saxon regime  
(b= -0.32, p=n.s.) than if living in countries with other welfare systems. For immigrants 
the smallest gap on ability to live on their income occurs between the Scandinavian and 
the Anglo-Saxon regimes. Conversely, the largest difference occurs between the 
Scandinavian and the Eastern regime (b= 1.43, p< 0.001), followed by the Southern 
regime (b= 0.98, p< 0.10). Controlling for individual-level characteristics in model 3 
reduce the gap in individuals’ ability to make ends meets among regimes. Including 
countries’ control variables in subsequent models does not contribute substantially to the 
explanatory power of the model with the exception of immigrants’ unemployment rate in 
model 6. Controlling for countries’ immigrant unemployment rate eliminates the positive 
effect of living under the Anglo-Saxon regime (b= 0.13, p= n.s), increases substantially 
the negative effect of living under the Southern (b= 1.21, p< 0.05) and Eastern (b= 1.50, 
p< 0.05) regimes and it also increases the positive effect of living in countries under the 
Scandinavian regime (b= -2.04, p< 0.001). Results support hypothesis 2.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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Hypothesis 3. The gap in the economic well-being of immigrants and native-
born individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian welfare 
regime than in countries with other regimes. 
  Estimates in model 2 table 5, indicate that the smallest gap between natives and 
foreigners as regards their ability to live on their income occurs in the Eastern regime (b= 
0.23, p< 0.10), followed by the Anglo-Saxon (b= 0.35, p< 0.10) and the Southern regimes 
(b= 0.46, p< 0.01). Conversely, the largest gap between both populations as regards their 
ability to cope in their household income occurs in the Bismarckian regime (b= 1.20, p< 
0.001), followed by the Scandinavian regime (b= 0.96, p< 0.001). Controlling for 
individual-levels characteristics eliminates the significant difference between the 
Scandinavian and Eastern regimes. This pattern does not change in subsequent models 
with the exception of model 7. Model 7 controls for countries’ degree of employment 
protection. Including this variable into the model decreases the gap between natives and 
foreigners as regards their ability to live on their income in the Southern regime (b= 0.54, 
p< 0.05) while it increases the gap in the Anglo-Saxon regime (b= 0.67, p< 0.05). Results 
do not support hypothesis 3.  
 
This section presents the results for the second research question of this study: 
What characteristics of the welfare state correlate with the economic well-being of 
immigrants? 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
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Hypothesis 4. Country’s amount of social spending will increase individuals’ 
economic well-being. 
 Estimates for table 6 shows that including the welfare effort variable in model 2 
helps to explain 32% of the total variance in individuals’ ability to make ends meet across 
countries.  There are not substantial differences in subsequent models except for model 5 
where countries’ unemployment rate for natives is introduced. Controlling for this 
variable increases the explanatory power of the model to 60%.  
Countries’ spending in social benefits or welfare effort contributes to individuals’ 
economic well-being, although its impact is larger for the native-born population than for 
their immigrant counterparts’ across models. As aspect that deserves further attention is 
that introducing natives’ unemployment rate in model 5 neutralizes the positive impact of 
countries’ social spending on individuals’ ability to live on their income for both 
populations alike. Additionally, estimates for table 7 show that differences between 
natives and immigrants on the impact of social spending on ability to live on household 
income are significant in the population. Results support hypothesis 4. 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 5. Individuals’ economic well-being will increase more as a result 
of country’s spending on non-means-tested benefits than as a result of 
countries’ spending on means-tested benefits.  
 Table 8 shows that including the welfare scope variables in model 2 helps to 
explain 24% of the total variance in individuals’ ability to make ends meet across 
countries.  There are not substantial differences in subsequent models except for model 5 
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where countries’ unemployment rate for natives is introduced. Controlling for this 
variable increases the explanatory power of the model to 57%. Countries’ welfare design 
or welfare scope contributes to individuals’ economic well-being although the impact of 
means-tested benefits is larger than the impact of non-means-tested benefits for both 
populations, natives and immigrants. As aspect that deserves further attention is that 
introducing natives’ unemployment rate in model 5 reduces the impact of countries’ 
social spending both populations’ economic well-being. Furthermore, it neutralizes the 
positive impact of social spending in non-means-tested benefits but it does not neutralize 
the positive impact of social spending in means-testing benefits on individuals’ ability to 
live on their income. Additionally, estimates for table 7 show that differences between 
natives and immigrants on the impact of welfare scope on individuals’ ability to live on 
their income are significant in the population. Results do not support hypothesis 5. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
The Welfare State as Agent of Immigrants’ Social Incorporation 
 
This section presents the results for the third research question of this study: Does 
the welfare state influence the reported social capital of foreign-born individuals?  
 
To answer this question, results from three outcome variables are presented:  
1) generalized trust, 2) trust in institutions and 3) frequency of informal social contacts.  
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Results for the impact of the welfare state on immigrants’ reported generalized 
trust, as compared to native-born, are presented in table 9. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Results for the impact of the welfare state on immigrants’ trust in institutions, as 
compared to native-born, are presented in table 10. 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Results for the impact of the welfare state on immigrants’ frequency of informal 
social contacts, as compared to native-born, are presented in table 11. 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
In model 0, the significant estimate for the variance of the intercept (b= 7.10, p< 
0.001) in table 9 indicates that there is significant variability in generalized trust across 
countries. The average level of generalized trust across countries is equal to 15.22. In 
addition, the intraclass correlation coefficient [7.10/ (7.10+27.37) = 0.20] indicates that 
20% of the variability in generalized trust occurs between countries.  
Turning to trust in institutions, the significant estimate for the variance of the 
intercept (b= 8.25, p< 0.001) in table 10 indicates that there is significant variability in 
trust in institutions across countries.  The average level of trust in institutions across 
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countries is equal to 16.14. In addition, the intraclass correlation coefficient [8.25/ 
(8.25+31.84) = 0.20] indicates that 20% of the variability in trust in institutions occurs 
between countries.  
Looking at frequency of informal social contacts in table 11, the significant 
estimate for the variance of the intercept (b= 8.48, p< 0.001) suggests that there is 
significant variability in how often individuals meet with family and friends across 
countries. The average frequency of informal social contacts across countries is equal to 
10. In addition, the intraclass correlation coefficient [8.48/ (8.48+93.13) = 0.08] indicates 
that 8% of the variability in frequency of informal social contacts among individuals 
occurs between countries.  
Model 1, investigates the impact of migratory status (0=native-born versus 
1=immigrant) on each social capital outcome. Model 1 in table 9 shows that the average 
level of generalized trust of a native-born individual is equal to 15.25. Likewise, the 
average generalized trust of a foreign-born individual is (15.25-0.30) = 14.95. Looking at 
model 1 in table 10, native-born individuals present an average level of trust in 
institutions in equal to 16.14, while for immigrants it is 0.53 points higher on average. 
Similarly, model 1 in table 11 shows that native-born individuals meet family and friends 
10 times on average. The average for immigrants to socialize with family and friends is 
0.18 times lower than for their native peers.  
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Hypothesis 6: The welfare state will influence individuals’ reported 
generalized trust.  
 Table 9 shows that including the welfare regime variables in model 2 helps to 
explain 17% of the total variance in generalized trust across countries.  Adding individual 
control variables into the model increases this explanatory power to 18%. Including the 
different country control variables in the subsequent models does not increase 
substantially the explanatory power of the welfare regime on individuals’ generalized 
trust. Additionally, most of the variability on individuals’ generalized trust occurs 
between countries. Results support hypothesis 6.  
 
Hypothesis 7: The welfare state will influence individuals’ reported trust in 
institutions.  
Table 10 shows that including the welfare regime variables in model 2 helps to 
explain 15% of the total variance in institutional trust across countries.  Adding 
individual control variables into the model increases this explanatory power to 17%. 
Including the different country control variables in the subsequent models does not 
increase substantially the explanatory power of the welfare regime on individuals’ trust in 
institutions. Additionally, most of the variability on individuals’ trust in institutions 
occurs between countries. Results support hypothesis 7.  
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Hypothesis 8: The welfare state will influence individuals’ frequency of 
informal social contacts.  
Table 11 shows that including the welfare regime variables in model 2 helps to 
explain 2% of the total variance across countries on how often individuals meet 
informally with friends and family. Adding individual control variables into the model 
increases this explanatory power to 12%, which suggest that individual characteristics are 
mainly responsible for the differences on frequency of social participation among 
individuals. Including the different country control variables in the subsequent models 
does not increase substantially the explanatory power of the welfare regime on 
individuals’ frequency of informal contacts. There is more variability between-countries 
than within-countries on individuals’ frequency of social participation, although the 
difference is much smaller than with the outcomes generalized trust and with trust in 
institutions. Results support hypothesis 8.  
 
Hypothesis 9: Individuals in the Scandinavian regime will report higher 
levels of generalized trust than individuals in other welfare regimes.  
 Coefficients for model 2 in table 9 indicate that a native-born individual living in 
a country under the Scandinavian regime presents and average generalized trust equal to 
19.38. Native-born living in other welfare regimes present lower levels of generalized 
trust than their Scandinavian counterparts. The smallest gap on generalized trust levels 
for native-born individuals occurs between the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon 
regimes (b= -2.51, p< 0.05). Conversely, the largest difference on levels of generalized 
trust for the native-born occurs between the Scandinavian and the Southern regime (b= -
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6.82, p< 0.001) closely followed by the Eastern regime (b= -6.15, p< 0.001). Controlling 
for individual characteristics in model 3 reduces the gap in generalized trust among 
regimes. Including countries’ percentage of immigrants in model 4 does not contribute 
substantially to the explanatory power of the model. However, controlling for countries’ 
market characteristics in models 5 (native unemployment rate) model 6(immigrant 
unemployment rate) and model 7 (degree of employment protection) reduce significantly 
natives’ levels of generalized trust.  
 Foreign-born individuals also present the highest level of generalized trust if 
living in countries under the Scandinavian regime (19.38-1.62) =17.76. The smallest gap 
on generalized trust levels occurs between the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon regime 
(b=-0.49, p=n.s.) although the difference is not significant in the population. Conversely, 
the largest difference on generalized trust for immigrants occurs between the 
Scandinavian and the Eastern regime (b= -4.51, p< 0.001) closely followed by the 
Southern regime (b= -4.46, p< 0.001). As with the native-born population, this pattern 
does not change substantially after introducing control variables in subsequent models 
with the exception of countries’ market variables in models 6 (immigrant unemployment 
rate) and 7 (degree of employment protection) which reduce substantially the generalized 
trust levels of foreign-born population.  Results support hypothesis 9.  
 
Hypothesis 10: Individuals in the Scandinavian regime will report higher 
levels of trust in institutions than individuals in other welfare regimes.  
Coefficients for model 2 in table 10 indicate that a native-born individual living in a 
country under the Scandinavian regime presents and average trust in institutions equal to 
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19.94. Native-born living in other welfare regimes present lower levels of generalized 
trust than their Scandinavian counterparts. The smallest gap on institutional trust for 
native-born individuals occurs between the Scandinavian and the Bismarckian regimes 
(b= -3.09, p< 0.05). Conversely, the largest difference on trust in institutions for the 
native-born occurs between the Scandinavian and the Eastern regime (b= -6.72, p< 
0.001). Controlling for individual characteristics in model 3 reduces the gap among 
regimes as regards natives’ trust in institutions. Including countries’ percentage of 
immigrants in model 4 does not contribute substantially to the explanatory power of the 
model. However, controlling for countries’ market characteristics in models 5 (native 
unemployment rate) model 6 (immigrant unemployment rate) and model 7 (degree of 
employment protection) reduce significantly natives’ levels of institutional trust.  
 Foreign-born individuals also present the highest level of trust in institutions if 
living in countries under the Scandinavian regime (19.94-0.38) =19.56. The smallest gap 
on immigrants trust in institutions levels occurs between the Scandinavian and Anglo-
Saxon regime (b=-1.61, p=n.s.), although the difference is not significant. Conversely, 
the largest difference for immigrants as regards levels of trust in institutions occurs 
between the Scandinavian and the Eastern regime (b= -6.57, p< 0.001). This pattern does 
not change substantially after introducing control variables in subsequent models with the 
exception of immigrant unemployment rate in model 6, which significantly reduces 
foreign-born individuals trust in country institutions. Results support hypothesis 10.  
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Hypothesis 11: Individuals in the Scandinavian regime will meet more often 
with family and friends than individuals in other welfare regimes.  
Coefficients for model 2 in table 11 indicate that a native-born individual living in 
a country under the Scandinavian regime meets family and friends 12.68 times on 
average. Native-born individuals living in other welfare regimes socialize less often than 
their Scandinavian counterparts. The smallest gap on frequency of socialization for 
native-born individuals occurs between the Scandinavian and the Southern regimes (b= -
1.62, p=n.s), although the difference is not significant. Conversely, the largest gap on 
frequency of socialization for the native-born occurs between the Scandinavian and the 
Eastern regime (b= -4.75, p< 0.001). Controlling for individual characteristics in model 3 
increases natives’ frequency of socialization. Including countries’ percentage of 
immigrants in model 4 and native and immigrant unemployment rates in model 5 and 6 
respectively do not contribute substantially to natives’ frequency of informal social 
contacts. However, including countries’ degree of employment protection in model 7 
significantly increases natives’ frequency of informal social contacts. In addition, adding 
the employment protection legislation index in model 7 eliminates differences in the 
population between the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon regimes as regards 
individuals’ frequency of informal social contacts.   
Foreign-born individuals also socialize more often than counterparts in other 
welfare regimes if living in countries under the Scandinavian regime (12.68+0.73) 
=13.42. The smallest gap on immigrants’ frequency of socialization occurs between the 
Scandinavian and the Bismarckian regime (b=-3.38, p=0.05). Conversely, the largest 
difference occurs between the Scandinavian and the Eastern regime (b= -5.96, p< 0.001). 
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Including individual-level characteristics in model 3 decreases immigrants’ frequency of 
socialization. This pattern does not change substantially after introducing control 
variables in subsequent models with the exception of countries’ degree of employment 
protection in model 7. Including countries’ degree of employment protection in model 7 
significantly increases immigrants’ frequency of informal social contacts. In addition, 
adding the employment protection legislation index in model 7 eliminates differences in 
the population between the Scandinavian and the Anglo-Saxon regimes as regards 
immigrants’ frequency of informal social contacts.  Results partially support hypothesis 
11.  
Hypothesis 12: The gap in generalized trust between immigrants and native-
born individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian welfare 
regime than in countries with other regimes. 
 Estimates for table 12 indicate that the largest gap between immigrants and 
natives as regards generalized trust happens in countries under a Scandinavian regime. 
Additionally, immigrants report lower levels of generalized trust than their native 
counterparts. Conversely, model 2 shows that the smallest difference on generalized trust 
between natives and immigrants occurs in countries under the Bismarckian regime (b= -
0.68, p< 0.10). Accounting for individual-level characteristics in model 3 turns the 
differences for the Bismarckian regime into not significant. In addition, it turns 
differences for the Southern regimes into significant in the population. Controlling for 
country percentage of immigrants in model 4 increases the difference in generalized trust 
between natives and immigrants for the Southern regime. Results do not support 
hypothesis 12.  
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[Table 12 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 13: The gap in trust in institutions between immigrants and 
native-born individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian 
welfare regime than in countries with other regimes.  
Estimates in table 13 show that there are not significant differences between 
natives and immigrants regarding their trust in institutions in countries under the 
Scandinavian regime. The smallest difference in institutional trust between both 
populations occurs in countries under the Bismarckian regime (b= -0.80, p< 0.10). 
Conversely, the largest gap between natives and immigrants on their reported levels of 
trust in institutions happens in countries under an Anglo-Saxon regime. Including 
individual-level characteristics in model 3 increases the difference for the Bismarckian 
regime while reduces the differences for the Southern and Eastern regimes. Including 
country’s percentage of immigrants in model 4, native unemployment rate in model 5 and 
immigrant unemployment rate in model 6 do not modify this pattern. However, including 
country’s degree of employment protection legislation in model 7 substantially increases 
the reported trust in institutions for the Anglo-Saxon regime. In addition, it turns into 
insignificant differences for the Southern regime. It is important to notice that on average 
immigrants report higher average levels of trust in institutions than their native peers 
across regimes. Results do not support hypothesis 13.  
 
[Table 13 about here] 
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Hypothesis 14: The gap in frequency of socialization between immigrants 
and native-born individuals will be smaller in countries with a Scandinavian 
welfare regime than in countries with other regimes.  
Estimates in table 14 show that there are not significant differences between 
natives and immigrants regarding their frequency of socialization in countries under the 
Scandinavian regime. Prior to controlling for individual characteristics model 2 shows 
that immigrants socialized more on average than their native counterparts, although 
differences are only significant for the Southern regime. After including individual 
characteristics in model 3 the frequency of socialization for immigrants as compared to 
natives becomes negative for the Southern regime. Results do not support hypothesis 14.  
 
[Table 14 about here] 
 
This section presents the results for the fourth research question of this study: 
What characteristics of the welfare state correlate with the reported social capital of 
immigrants? 
 
Hypothesis 15. Country’s amount of social spending will increase 
individuals’ reported social trust. 
 Estimates for model 2 in table 15 show that accounting for countries’ spending in 
social benefits helps to explain 6% of the total variance in individuals’ generalized trust 
across countries.  Controlling for individual-level characteristics in model 3 increases this 
variability to 8%. There are not substantial differences in subsequent models except for 
  98 
model 5 where countries’ unemployment rate for natives is introduced. Controlling for 
this variable increases the explanatory power of the model to 11%. Countries’ spending 
in social benefits or welfare effort contributes to individuals’ generalized trust, although 
its impact is larger for the native-born population than for their immigrant counterparts’ 
across models. Two aspects deserve further attention. The first one is that introducing 
natives’ unemployment rate in model 5 neutralizes the positive impact of welfare effort in 
both populations’ generalized trust. The same pattern is observed after introducing 
countries’ index of employment protection legislation in model 7. Estimates for table 7 
show that differences between natives and immigrants as regards the impact of countries’ 
spending in social benefits are not significant in the population. Results support 
hypothesis 15. 
 
[Table 15 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 16. Country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits will increase 
individuals’ reported generalized trust while country’s spending in means-
tested benefits will decrease it. 
 Table 16 shows that including the welfare scope variables in model 2 helps to 
explain 2% of the total variance in individuals’ levels of generalized trust across 
countries.  Controlling for individual-level characteristics in model 3 increases this 
variability to 6%. There are not substantial differences in subsequent models except for 
model 5 where countries’ unemployment rate for natives is introduced. Controlling for 
this variable increases the explanatory power of the model to 9%.  
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Countries’ welfare design or welfare scope contributes to individuals’ reported 
generalized trust. Furthermore, country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits 
decreases generalized trust, although it is only significant after controlling for countries’ 
index of employment protection in model 7. In addition, countries’ spending in non-
means-tested benefits increases generalized trust and the differences are significant across 
models for the native-born population. An aspect that deserves further attention is that 
introducing natives’ unemployment rate in model 5 eliminates the impact of countries’ 
spending in non-means-tested benefits on generalized trust. Estimates for table 7 show 
that differences between natives and immigrants as regards the impact of countries’ 
spending in social benefits are not significant in the population. Results partially support 
hypothesis 16. 
 [Table 16 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 17. Country’s amount of social spending will increase 
individuals’ reported trust in institutions. 
Estimates for model 2 in table 17 show that accounting for countries’ spending in 
social benefits helps to explain 5% of the total variance in individuals’ reported trust in 
institutions across countries.  Controlling for individual-level characteristics in model 3 
increases this variability to 7%. There are not substantial differences in subsequent 
models except for model 5 where countries’ unemployment rate for natives is introduced. 
Controlling for this variable increases the explanatory power of the model to 9%.  
Countries’ expenditure in social benefits or welfare effort contributes to 
institutional trust, and the impact is almost equivalent for both populations. Additionally, 
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estimates for table 7 show that differences between natives and immigrants as regards the 
impact of countries’ social spending in their reported trust in institutions are significant in 
the population. Results support hypothesis 17. 
 
[Table 17 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 18. Country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits will increase 
individuals’ reported institutional trust while country’s spending in means-
tested benefits will decrease it. 
Table 18 shows that including the welfare scope variables in model 2 helps to 
explain 4% of the total of individuals’ reported trust in institutions across countries.  
Controlling for individual-level characteristics in model 3 increases this variability to 6%. 
There are not substantial differences in subsequent models except for model 5 where 
countries’ unemployment rate for natives is introduced. Controlling for this variable 
increases the explanatory power of the model to 8%.  
Countries’ welfare design or welfare scope contributes to individuals’ reported 
trust in institutions. Furthermore, countries’ social spending in non-means-tested benefits 
increases individuals’ reported trust in institutions, and the impact is almost equivalent 
for both immigrants and native-born populations. In addition, countries’ social spending 
in means-tested benefits decreases institutional trust although differences are only 
significant for the native-born population. Additionally, estimates for table 7 show that 
differences between natives and immigrants as regards the impact of countries’ 
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expenditures in their reported trust in institutions are significant in the population. Results 
support hypothesis 18. 
[Table 18 about here] 
 
Hypothesis 19. Country’s amount of social spending will increase 
individuals’ frequency of informal social contacts.   
Estimates for model 2 in table 19 show that accounting for countries’ spending in 
social benefits helps to explain 0.13% of the total variance in individuals’ frequency of 
informal social contacts across countries.  Controlling for individual-level characteristics 
in model 3 increases this variability to 10%. Although including native unemployment 
rate in model 5 does not increase the explanatory power of the model substantially, it 
decreases both populations frequency of informal social contacts. Including countries’ 
degree of employment protection legislation in model 7 increases frequency of 
socialization.  
Countries’ spending in social benefits increases both populations’ frequency of 
socialization and the impact is almost equivalent for both populations. Including native 
unemployment rate in model 5 neutralizes the positive impact of country’s spending in 
social benefits on individuals’ frequency of informal social contacts. Estimates for table 7 
show that differences between natives and immigrants as regards the impact of welfare 
effort of their frequency of socialization are not significant in the population. Results 
partially support hypothesis 19. 
 
[Table 19 about here] 
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Hypothesis 20. Country’s spending in non-means-tested benefits will increase 
individuals’ frequency of informal social contacts while country’s spending 
in means-tested benefits will decrease it.  
Estimates for model 2 in table 20 show that accounting for countries’ spending in 
social benefits does not help total variance in individuals’ frequency of informal social 
contacts across countries.  Controlling for individual-level characteristics in model 3 
increases this variability to 10%. Although including native unemployment rate in model 
5 does not increase the explanatory power of the model substantially, it decreases both 
populations frequency of informal social contacts. Including countries’ degree of 
employment protection legislation in model 7 increases the frequency of socialization of 
the native-born population.  
Welfare scope does not significantly contribute to natives’ frequency of informal 
social contacts. Model 2 shows that countries’ spending in non-means-tested benefits 
increases immigrants frequency of socialization. However, controlling for individual-
level control variables in model 3 turn the impact of spending in means-tested benefits 
into insignificant in the population. Additionally, it turns into negative the impact of 
spending in means-tested benefits in immigrants’ frequency of socialization, although 
differences are not significant in the population. Estimates for table 7 show that 
differences between natives and immigrants as regards the impact of welfare scope of 
their frequency of socialization are not significant in the population. Results partially 
support hypothesis 20. 
 
[Table 20 about here] 
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Chapter Six 
 
Discussion 
 
 The primary goal of this dissertation was to examine the correlation between the 
welfare state and the economic and social incorporation of foreign-born individuals into 
recipient societies. Additionally, this dissertation investigated whether two key traits of 
the welfare state, welfare effort and welfare design, were part of the relationship.  
 The role of the welfare state in the economic incorporation of international labor 
has been the focus of the political economy literature for the last few decades and despite 
wonderful contributions, this literature also presents several limitations. The first is that it 
has paid little attention to isolate the role of the welfare state on the economic 
incorporation of foreign labor. It has been a common practice of prior literature to focus 
on immigrants’ economic outcomes such as employment and occupational status and to 
attribute differences in outcomes to presumed welfare characteristics of the contexts of 
reception. However, to gauge the impact of the welfare state on immigrants’ chances of 
incorporation requires evaluating its influence separately from the influence of 
individual-level confounders. Only a handful of studies have employed this 
methodological approach.  
A second limitation, closely related to the first one, is that past literature has 
mainly employed the welfare regime theory to evaluate the impact of the welfare state on 
immigrants’ economic incorporation. However, past studies have rarely included 
theoretical characteristics of the welfare state on the analyses.  
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A third limitation stems from how previous empirical literature has 
conceptualized the role of the welfare state. From the assumption that market attainment 
is equivalent to economic incorporation, past literature has mainly employed indicators of 
market performance to assess the success, or lack thereof, of different welfare regimes on 
the economic incorporation of foreign-born populations. However, the welfare state 
originated as a redistributive mechanism to compensate for the economic inequalities 
derived from participating in liberal markets. Yet its capacity to compensate for the 
economic challenges faced by immigrant population when settling in a new country has 
rarely been addressed in a multilevel context.   
Concerning social incorporation, whether the welfare state promotes or erodes 
immigrants’ social capital has been investigated in countries representative of the 
Scandinavian regime, but it has not been addressed in a cross-national setting.  
To address these limitations this dissertation pursued three goals.  
First, it aimed to isolate the ability of the welfare state to compensate for the 
economic challenges faced by foreign-born labor when settling in a new country. More 
specifically, this dissertation tested a) whether the welfare state contributes to the 
economic well-being of natives and immigrants differently and b) whether 
comprehensive welfare regimes compensate better than residual regimes for the 
economic challenges faced by immigrant populations when settling in a new country.  
Second, it investigated whether the welfare state influenced the social capital of 
foreign-born. Particularly, this study addressed a) whether the welfare state impacts the 
social capital of natives and immigrants differently and b) whether comprehensive 
welfare regimes promote or erode the social capital of foreign-born populations.  
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The third goal of this dissertation was to test whether two key characteristics of 
the welfare state, social spending or welfare effort and welfare design or welfare scope, 
contribute to the economic well-being and to the social capital of immigrant populations.  
 
The Welfare State as Agent of Immigrants’ Economic Incorporation 
 A main contribution of this study is that examines the welfare state’s ability to 
compensate for the economic hardships faced by foreign-born populations when settling 
in a new country. Additionally, it investigates the impact of two welfare theoretical 
characteristics, welfare effort and welfare scope, on immigrants’ economic well-being. 
This section summarizes the findings and discusses their contribution to the literature in 
terms of 1- whether comprehensive welfare regimes compensate better than residual 
regimes for the economic challenges faced by immigrant populations when settling in a 
new country, 2-the contribution of welfare effort and welfare scope on immigrants’ 
economic well-being.  
 
Is the Scandinavian regime more beneficial for the economic well-being of 
immigrants than other welfare systems?  
 Past research suggests that immigrants are at disadvantage to compete with the 
native population in the labor market of recipient societies (Constant & Schultz-Nielsen, 
2004; Kesler, 2006).  Furthermore, it seems that the flexible labor markets of countries 
with an Anglo-Saxon welfare regime are particularly beneficial for the economic 
incorporation of international labor (Engelen, 2003; Kogan, 2007a).  
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Results from this study partially support past literature. Immigrants and natives 
make ends meet most easily in countries with a Scandinavian welfare regime than in 
countries representative of other systems of welfare protection. Conversely, both groups 
struggle most financially in countries with an Eastern welfare regime, followed by 
countries with a Southern regime. Additionally, there are not differences for both, native 
and immigrant populations, as regards their ability to live on household income between 
the Scandinavian, the Bismarckian and the Anglo-Saxon regime.   
An interesting finding is that accounting for a country’s rate of immigrant 
unemployment increases immigrants’ likelihood to live comfortably with their income in 
the Scandinavian regime while it decreases this likelihood in both the Southern and 
Eastern regimes.  This suggests that the re-distributive capacity of the Scandinavian 
regime may protect immigrants better from economic hardship associated with 
unemployment than more residual systems of protection which mainly rely on the market 
to international labor into their social fabric. 
Concerning differences on individuals’ ability to live on household income across 
welfare regimes, the smallest gap between immigrants and natives occurs in the Anglo-
Saxon regime followed by the Southern system of social protection. The largest gap 
between natives and immigrants on ability to make ends meet happens across welfare 
regimes happens in countries representative of the Bismarckian regime followed by 
countries with a Scandinavian system of welfare protection. This suggests that the impact 
of comprehensive systems of social protection is not equivalent between populations. It 
might be because immigrants do not have the same access to social benefits than their 
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native counterparts or because the impact of comprehensive social policies is less 
effective for immigrant populations than for their native peers.  
 
The impact of welfare effort and welfare scope on the economic well-being of 
immigrants as compared to native-born populations.  
As regards to welfare characteristics associated with immigrants’ economic 
incorporation, both a country’s welfare effort (expenditure on social benefits) and welfare 
scope (social spending on non means-tested benefits versus social spending in means-
tested social benefits) influence immigrants’ ability to make ends meet. However, 
immigrants have more difficulties to live on their household income than their native 
peers regardless of the welfare regime or social protection spending.  
Welfare effort contributes positively to immigrants’ economic well-being, 
although it exerts a lesser effect than for the native-born population. Both indicators of 
welfare scope contribute to immigrants’ economic well-being, although the impact of 
social spending in means-tested benefits is larger than the impact of social spending in 
non-means-tested benefits. Additionally, controlling for country’s unemployment rate 
lessen the impact of both, welfare effort and welfare scope, on immigrants’ ability to live 
on their income.  
In summary, the welfare state influences immigrants’ economic incorporation into 
European countries. The Scandinavian regime compensates better than the Eastern and 
Southern regimes for the challenges associated with settling economically in a foreign 
country, although regardless the system of social protection, immigrants do not reach 
parity with their native peers on their ability to live on their income. There are not 
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differences for immigrants and natives on ability to live on household income between 
the Scandinavian, the Anglo-Saxon and the Bismarckian. The largest difference between 
natives and immigrants as regards to the probability of managing with their earnings 
occurs in countries with a Bismarckian regime while the smallest gap occurs in countries 
representative of the Anglo-Saxon cluster.  
Both welfare effort and welfare scope contribute to immigrants’ economic well-
being, although the impact is smaller than for the native population. The impact of 
countries’ spending in means-tested benefits on immigrants’ ability to make ends meet is 
larger than the impact of countries’ spending in non-means-tested benefits. 
Unemployment rate decreases the positive impact of welfare effort and welfare scope on 
immigrants’ economic well-being.  
 
The Welfare State as Agent of Immigrants’ Social Incorporation 
A major contribution of this study is that investigates the ability of the welfare 
state to promote the social capital of immigrant communities. Additionally, it examines 
the impact of two theoretical characteristics of the welfare state, welfare effort and 
welfare scope, on immigrants’ reported indicators of social capital. This section 
summarizes the findings and discusses their contribution to the literature in terms of 1- 
whether comprehensive welfare regimes promote or erode the formation of social capital 
in immigrant communities 2-the contribution of welfare effort and welfare scope on 
immigrants’ reported indicators of social capital. 
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Does the Scandinavian regime promotes or erodes social capital among 
immigrant communities?  
Immigrants living in countries representative of the Scandinavian regime report 
higher social trust than peers living in countries representative of other welfare regimes. 
These findings expand previous research which reported that the welfare state influenced 
positively the social trust of foreign-born populations in Sweden and Denmark (Kumlin, 
2002, 2004; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005, 2008; Nannestad and Svendsen, 2006, 2008; 
Rothstein, 1998, Rothstein & Stolle, 2003).  
For immigrants, the smallest gap on reported generalized trust occurs between the 
Scandinavian and the Bismarckian regime while the largest gap is between the 
Scandinavian and the Southern and Eastern regimes. There are not significant differences 
on reported generalized trust for immigrants between the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon 
regimes. The same patter holds for native-born populations, although all the differences 
are significant for this group.  
The averaged reported generalized trust is higher for natives than for immigrants 
in countries representative of the Scandinavian regime, followed by countries 
representative of the Bismarckian regime. Conversely, immigrants in countries 
representative of the Southern regime report, on average, higher generalize trust than 
their native peers. There are not significant differences between both populations for the 
Anglo-Saxon and Eastern regimes.   
These findings support previous research on the positive association between 
social capital and residing in countries with a Social-Democratic welfare system (Crepaz, 
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2008; Fridberg & Kangas, 2008; Kaariainen & Lehtonen, 2006; Listhaug & Ringdal, 
2008, Scheepers et al., 2002; Van Oorschot & Arts, 2005).  
Immigrants living in countries representative of the Scandinavian regime also 
report higher trust in institutions than peers living in countries representative of other 
welfare regimes. For immigrants, the smallest gap on reported institutional trust occurs 
between the Scandinavian and the Bismarckian regime while the largest gap is between 
the Scandinavian and the Eastern regime.  
Although countries’ rate of immigrant unemployment reduces immigrants 
reported institutional trust, its impact is much larger for countries representative of the 
Anglo-Saxon, Southern and Eastern regimes than for countries representative of the 
Scandinavian and Bismarckian regimes.  
There are not significant differences between immigrants and natives reported 
trust in institutions in the Scandinavian and Eastern regimes. The smallest difference 
between natives and immigrants concerning institutional trust occurs in the Bismarckian 
regime, closely followed by the Southern regime. The largest difference occurs in 
countries representative of the Anglo-Saxon regime. On average immigrants report 
higher trust in institutions than their native peers.  
Immigrants socialize more in countries representative of the Scandinavian regime 
than in countries representative of other welfare systems. For immigrants the smallest 
difference on frequency of socialization happens between the Scandinavian and the 
Bismarckian regimes and the largest between the Scandinavian and the Eastern regime. 
Countries’ degree of employment protection legislation increases immigrants’ chances of 
socialization.   
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There are not significant differences between immigrants and natives frequency of 
socialization with the exception of the Southern and Eastern regimes. Immigrants 
socialize more often than their native counterparts in the Eastern regime but less often 
than their native peers in the Southern regime.  
Two interesting trends appear regarding the welfare state influence on 
immigrants’ reported social capital. The first one is that the smallest difference on 
reported social capital between immigrants and native-born populations does not occur in 
countries representative of the Scandinavian regime as it was anticipated. A plausible 
explanation is that immigrants might not have the same access to welfare benefits as their 
native counterparts in the Scandinavian system. Another explanation is that, although 
both populations may have parity on welfare access, social benefits may not be as 
‘effective’ for immigrant populations as they are for the native-born population.   
The second trend is particularly interesting because it does not support past 
research, specifically that immigration status and social capital are negatively correlated 
(Cheong et al., 2007; Coffe & Geys, 2006). Immigrants present higher levels of 
institutional trust than their native peers across regimes.  
There are two possible reasons for this outcome. The first is that as welfare 
coverage (or the access to it) decreases, immigrants rely more than their native 
counterparts on informal networks of solidarity to guarantee their basic needs and these 
interactions foster the generation of social capital. A second explanation is that 
immigrants’ reported social capital may be influenced by characteristics associated to 
their countries of origin or to selectivity factors related to the migratory process. 
Unfortunately this study does not account for such variables.  
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The impact of welfare effort and welfare scope on the social capital of 
immigrant communities as compared to native-born.  
As regards to welfare characteristics associated with immigrants’ reported social 
capital, both a country’s welfare effort (expenditure on social benefits) and welfare scope 
(social spending on non means-tested benefits versus social spending in means-tested 
benefits) influence immigrants’ social capital.  
Specifically, welfare effort increases both natives and immigrants’ reported 
generalized trust, although the influence is larger for the native born. In addition, 
countries’ unemployment rate decreases immigrants and natives reported generalized 
trust. Welfare effort also increases immigrants and natives trust in institutions, and the 
impact is almost equivalent for both populations. Countries’ spending on social benefits 
increases immigrants frequency of socialization. It also influences how often natives meet 
family and friends, but only after controlling for percentage of immigrants in country. In 
addition, countries’ unemployment rate decreases immigrants and natives frequency of 
socialization. Only for trust in institutions are the differences between natives and 
immigrants significant in the population.  
Concerning welfare scope, social spending in means-tested benefits decreases 
natives and immigrants reported generalized trust, although the effect is significantly 
stronger for the native-born population. Social spending in means-tested benefits also 
decreases natives’ reported trust in institutions, although the impact is not significant for 
the immigrant population. Social spending in means-tested benefits does not influence 
natives or immigrants’ frequency of social contacts. Additionally, countries rate of 
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unemployment decreases both populations reported generalized trust and frequency of 
informal social contacts.  
Social spending in non-means-tested benefits increases both natives and 
immigrants reported generalized trust, although the impact is larger for the native-born. 
Social spending in non-means-tested benefits also increases both natives and immigrants 
reported institutional trust and the impact is almost equivalent for both populations. 
Social spending in non-means-tested benefits also increases immigrants’ frequency of 
informal social contacts.  Additionally, countries rate of unemployment decreases both 
populations reported generalized trust and frequency of informal social contacts.  
The above results seem to indicate that comprehensive welfare systems promote 
the social capital formation of immigrant communities. The positive influence appears to 
stem from countries’ amount of social spending, particularly in non-means-tested 
programs. These results expand past findings which reported that in Sweden (archetype 
of the Scandinavian regime) immigrants’ indicators of generalized trust increased if 
granted equal access to social resources and if they were treated with equal consideration 
and respect than the native-born population when dealing with welfare services (Kumlin, 
2002, 2004; Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005, 2008; Rothstein, 1998).  
In summary, the welfare state influences immigrants’ social capital. 
Comprehensive systems foster the social capital accumulation of immigrant communities. 
A remarkable contribution is that being a foreigner is not necessarily associated with 
lesser amounts of social capital. Another important contribution is that social spending in 
means-tested benefits is detrimental for the social capital formation of immigrant 
communities.  
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Implications for Policy and Practice 
Policy-makers and practitioners have not paid enough attention to the role of the 
welfare state in the incorporation of foreign-born populations into host societies. If as this 
study suggest, the welfare state influences immigrants’ economic well-being and 
promotes social capital, this has obvious implications for policy and practice.  Based on 
the findings of this study, this section discusses the implications for policy and practice of 
welfare state on the economic and social incorporation of foreign-born populations.  
 
Implications for policy. 
 The current study suggests that the welfare state impacts significantly immigrants’ 
chances of incorporation into host societies. Furthermore, this research indicates that the 
design of the welfare state matters and that comprehensive systems of social protection 
are more beneficial for immigrants’ well-being than are residual systems. A policy 
implication stemming from this finding is straightforward; granting foreign-born access 
to host societies’ market is not enough to assure their socio-economic incorporation. 
Granting foreigners access to social benefits of the recipient societies seems as well to be 
desirable to foster social cohesion. If the findings of this study are correct, expanding 
welfare institutions and increasing the access to foreign-born populations may improve 
the social cohesion of recipient societies. Social cohesion is desirable within a society 
because cohesive societies have stronger and better working democracies, more 
successful economies, and lower rates of crime and corruption (Putnam, 1993; Rothstein 
& Stolle, 2003). 
A natural experiment concerning foreign-born access to a country’s system of 
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social protection reinforces this recommendation. In 1996 the United States passed two 
pieces of legislation- the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) and the Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) -that changed forever the relationship between the welfare state and foreign-
born population in that country. Since the passage of the law, citizenship became the 
criteria for entitlement to welfare benefits. The rationale underlying PRWORA was an 
increased perception that immigrant families had become a “burden” for federal 
government welfare expenditures and that non-citizens should not depend on the 
government, but on their own efforts and sponsors, to find their way into society. The 
reform established that foreign-born were not eligible for welfare benefits for the first 
five in the USA and their eligibility was established by each state afterwards 
(Espenshade, Bakara & Huber, 1997; Fix & Passel, 2002).  
 The welfare reform resulted in a sharp decrease of the number of immigrant 
families enrolled in welfare programs. As a consequence, the poverty rate of the children 
of immigrants increased substantially. Additionally, there was an increase on segregation 
practices since students with limited English proficiency were allocated in schools were 
most of the population had also limited English abilities. Closely related was an 
increment of the school dropout rate among the children of immigrant, particularly 
among those of Hispanic origin. Another unintended consequence related with preventing 
foreign-born access from accessing social benefits was a sharp increment of uninsured 
individuals with no access to health care (Fix, Zimmerman & Passel, 2001).  
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Implications for practice. 
 This study does not focus in how the welfare state actually operates to facilitate 
immigrants’ incorporation. However, past scholars have argued that being fairly treated 
when dealing with public institutions is as important to people as getting a positive 
outcome (Lind & Tyler, 1988). The argument is that procedural justice is embedded in 
the design and delivery of social services of the welfare state. Immigrants who are treated 
with the same respect and consideration than then native-born population by the host 
country welfare institutions tend to develop better incorporation outcomes than 
counterparts who experience arbitrary practices or perceive that are not deemed worthy of 
the service (Rothstein, 1998; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2004). If the theory is correct there are 
obvious implications for practice. Practitioners should be aware of the culture of the 
population they are serving to be able to deliver culturally competent services which 
foster clients’ dignity. Closely related is the desirability for practitioners and agencies to 
be able to communicate with their clients. Social service practitioners should be able to 
speak the language of the population they serve or at least to count with adequate 
translations services. A related strategy is that social services should seek training and 
hiring practitioners from the same communities as the populations they serve.  
 
Limitations and Future Research  
Even though this study contributes to understanding the relationship between the 
welfare state and the incorporation of foreign-born populations in recipient societies, it 
presents several limitations which should be considered in future research.  
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 Limited Number of Countries.  The study employs a limited number of level-2 
units (countries). A small sample size at the highest hierarchical level can result on a 
restricted power of the test when the primary goal of the study is to investigate the effect 
of level-2 variables in level-1 units (Maas & Hox, 2005). This study tests the relationship 
of welfare and welfare characteristics (level-2 variables) on individuals’ incorporation 
into host societies (level-1 units). The limited ratio between units increased the 
probability to commit Type II error or the failure to reject a false null hypothesis.  Future 
research should consider increasing the power of the test by adding a larger number of 
level-2 units in the analyses.  
Better Measures. The welfare state and social capital are complex constructs at 
their very early stages of development. Consequently, the variables employed to measure 
these concepts might not represent them accurately. For example, welfare state measures, 
such as regime type and welfare effort and scope, might not exhaustively capture the 
characteristics of different welfare systems. The classification of countries under 
particular welfare regimes, the number of regimes, their characteristics and the suitability 
of the methodology employed to classify regimes and countries, are still intensely 
debated in the literature (Arts &Gelissen 2002; Bambra, 2006, 2007). Additionally, 
welfare effort or countries’ expenditure on social benefits may capture only partially the 
construct of welfare state given that the welfare state is established on the interplay of the 
market, the family and the state. Similarly, welfare scope, particularly countries’ social 
spending in non-means-tested benefits, is not equivalent to welfare’ degree of 
universalism. Non-means-tested benefits do not imply universal access of the population. 
Non-means-tested benefits include both, benefits of universal access such as health care 
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and education but also benefits tailored exclusively for particular groups such as civil 
servants. Thus, future research should consider different alternatives to classify welfare 
regimes and the countries within each regime. Additionally, further research is needed 
including more accurate measures of welfare degree of universalism and indicators of the 
interrelation between the market, the state and the family.    
Third, Omitted Variables. Time spent in the host country and immigrant 
generation are two aspects that should be included in the analyses if attempting to gauge 
immigrants’ degree of incorporation into host societies. Although it is still under 
discussion whether time spent in the recipient country is beneficial or damaging for 
immigrants’ incorporation processes, research suggest that time and immigrant 
generation influence immigrants economic position and their understanding of recipient 
societies’ norms and culture (Alba & Nee, 2003; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Future research 
should include time spent in the host country among foreign-born individuals when 
evaluating the impact of the welfare state on their incorporation processes. Additionally, 
research should be conducted to test if the welfare state influences the incorporation 
processes of the descendent of foreign-born differently that the incorporation processes of 
their parents.  
Country of origin is another variable that has been associated with variability in 
economic and social capital incorporation outcomes. For example, Kogan (2007a) found 
that immigrants from Asian countries were less likely to be unemployed in Europe than 
counterparts originally from countries of the sub-Saharan Africa region. Past research 
also suggest that immigrants who proceed from countries less economically developed 
than the recipient communities present economic performance than peers from wealthier 
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regions (Van Tubergen, 2006). 
Concerning social capital variability, one study conducted in Denmark found that 
the difference between the quality of institutions of sending and receiving communities 
had a substantial influence on immigrants’ levels of generalized trust (Nannestad & 
Svendsen, 2005). Future research should include characteristics of the sending 
communities in the analyses to investigate if they exert a mediating role on the 
relationship of different welfare systems with immigrants’ economic and social 
incorporation.  
Fourth, Causality. The cross-sectional nature of this study does not allow 
verifying casual relationships. It is not possible assert whether generous welfare states 
influence individuals’ economic well-being or the formation of social capital or if the 
opposite relationship is in place and communities with high levels of social trust tend to 
establish comprehensive systems of welfare protection. Future research should address 
this question by employing more sophisticated designs and data sources that allow for 
such analyses.  
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Figure 1: Welfare Regimes Classification by Country and Author. 
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Figure 2: Country Level Factors Related to Immigrants’ Economic Incorporation. 
 
Note: Significant welfare regimes ranked in descendent order according to coefficients 
(+) Positive correlation; (-) Negative correlation; (!) Not significant; 
(N/A) Not applicable; (ref) Referent regime.  
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Figure 3: Country Level Factors Related to Social Trust. 
 
Note: Significant welfare regimes ranked in descendent order according to coefficients 
(+) Positive correlation; (-) Negative correlation; (!) Not significant; 
(N/A) Not applicable; (ref) Referent regime.  
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Figure 4: Country Level Factors Related to Individuals’ Social Participation. 
 
Note: Significant welfare regimes ranked in descendent order according to coefficients 
(+) Positive correlation; (-) Negative correlation; (!) Not significant; 
(N/A) Not applicable; (ref) Referent regime.  
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Figure 5: Countries by Round Included in the ESS Cumulative Data File. 
 
Source: European Social Survey1-3e01 Variable Documentation List. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country  Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
Austria X X X 
Belgium X X X 
Czech Republic X X  
Denmark X X X 
Estonia  X X 
Finland X X X 
France X X X 
Germany X X X 
Greece X X  
Great Britain X X X 
Hungary X X X 
Ireland X X X 
Italy X X  
Luxembourg X X  
Netherlands X X X 
Norway X X X 
Poland X X X 
Portugal X X X 
Slovakia  X X 
Slovenia X X X 
Spain X X X 
Sweden X X X 
Switzerland X X X 
Ukraine  X X 
  
Figure 6:  Variables Included in the Study.  
 
 Name Measurement 
DVs 
 
  
Feeling about 
household income 
Respondent’s ability to live with current household income coded as 1=very 
difficult, 2=difficult, 3=copying, 4=living comfortably. 
Economic 
Incorporation 
  
   
Generalized trust Respondent’s trust in others (scale ranging from 0 to 30). 
Trust in institutions Respondent’s trust in governmental institutions (scale ranging from 0 to 30). 
  
  
  
Frequency of informal 
social contacts 
How often respondent meets friends, relatives or colleagues (scale ranging 
from never=0 to every day=30). 
Social Trust 
 
 
 
 
Social Participation 
  
IVs 
 
  
Foreign-born 0=native-born individuals. 
1= foreign-born individuals from countries outside the European Union. 
  
Individual-level 
  
   
Welfare regime Scandinavian, Bismarckian, Anglo-Saxon, Southern, Easter (dummy 
variables). 
Welfare effort Percentage of countries’ GDP invested in social protection benefits. 
Country-level 
Welfare scope Percentage of countries’ GDP invested in non-means-tested social protection 
benefits. 
Percentage of countries’ GDP invested in means-tested social protection 
benefits. 
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Figure 6:  Variables Included in the Analyses (cont.). 
 Name Measurement 
Control  
Variables 
  
 
 
  
Individual-level   
Age Respondent’s age in years. 
Age squared Respondent’s age in years squared. 
Gender Respondent’s reported gender (no=0/yes=1). 
Partnered Respondent lives with husband, wife, partner (no=0/yes=1).  
Residential parent Respondent has children living in the household (no=0/yes=1). 
Rural area Respondent lives in a rural area (no=0/yes=1). 
  
 
 
   Demographic 
  
  
Education Respondent’s years of full time education completed (0 to 25 and over). 
Employed Respondent is in paid work (no=0/yes=1). 
Unemployed Respondent is unemployed (no=0/yes=1). 
Inactive Respondent is neither in paid work nor unemployed (no=0/yes=1). 
 
 
   Socio-
economic  
 
  
Percentage of Immigrants Percentage of non-European foreign-born population in country. 
Native-born unemployment rate Percentage of native-born unemployed population in country. 
Foreign-born unemployment 
rate 
Percentage of native-born unemployed population in country. 
 
Country-level  
EPL index Index of employment protection legislation. 
  
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Size by Country and Population. 
 
*Data weighted applying design weights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Native-born (%) Foreign-born (%) Total (%) 
Austria 5,767  (5.18) 299  (0.27) 6,067 (5.44) 
Belgium 4,506  (4.04) 218  (0.20) 4,724 (4.24) 
Czech Republic 3,916  (3.51)   70  (0.63) 3,987 (3.58) 
Denmark 4,008  (3.60) 171  (0.15) 4,179 (3.75) 
Estonia 2,172  (1.95) 668  (0.60) 2,840 (2.55) 
Finland 5,649  (5.07)   54  (0.48) 5,703 (5.12) 
France 4,223  (3.79) 322  (0.29) 4,544 (4.08) 
Germany 7,322  (6.57) 576  (0.52) 7,898 (7.09) 
Great Britain 5,241  (4.70) 435  (0.39) 5,676 (5.09) 
Greece 4,107  (3.69) 413  (0.37) 4,519 (4.06) 
Hungary 4,381  (3.93)   85  (0.76) 4,466 (4.01) 
Ireland 5,378  (2.36) 100  (0.90) 5,478 (4.92) 
Italy  2,625  (2.36)   38  (0.34) 2,667 (2.39) 
Luxembourg 1,514  (1.36) 201  (0.18) 1,716 (1.54) 
Netherlands 5,264  (4.72) 372  (0.33) 5,636 (5.06) 
Norway 4,932  (4.43) 180  (0.16) 5,112 (4.59) 
Poland 5,265  (4.72)   37  (0.34) 5,299 (4.76) 
Portugal 5,398  (4.75) 279  (0.25) 5,577 (5.01) 
Spain 4,827  (4.33) 265  (0.24) 5,091 (4.57) 
Slovenia 3,678  (3.30) 295  (0.26) 3,973 (3.57) 
Slovakia 2,975  (2.67)     6  (0.00) 2,981 (2.68) 
Sweden 4,783  (4.29) 358  (0.32) 5,141 (4.61) 
Switzerland 4,148  (3.72) 429  (0.39) 4,577 (4.11) 
Ukraine  3,243  (2.91) 338  (0.30) 3,581 (3.21) 
Total 105,214 (94.43) 6,172 (5.57) 111,386 (100.0) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-Level Variables* 
 
*Data weighted applying design weights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables Native-born Foreign-born 
Ability to live on household income (%)   
     Very difficult    5.37  10.46*** 
     Difficult  16.59  24.94*** 
     Able  45.62  43.56*** 
     Living comfortably  32.42  21.04*** 
Generalized trust (units) 15.55  14.99*** 
Trust in institutions (units) 15.86  16.45*** 
Frequency of informal social contacts (units) 10.04   9.85*** 
Independent Variables   
Age (years) 46.40 43.87*** 
Male (%) 47.17 46.91 
Residential parent (%) 41.99 50.91*** 
Partnered (%) 63.32 65.15** 
Living in rural area (%) 42.02 20.60*** 
Education (%) 11.81 12.05*** 
Employed (%) 50.13 51.11 
Unemployed (%)   4.41   7.96*** 
Inactive (%) 45.44 40.91*** 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Country-Level Variables. 
 
Pmig= Percentage of non-EU immigrants per country. 
Nunem= Native-born unemployment rate. 
Funem= Foreign-born unemployment rate. 
EPL= Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Pmig(%) Nunem(%) Funem(%) EPL 
Austria   4.82   4.13   13.3   2.22 
Belgium   3.51   6.63   34.5   2.50 
Czech Republic   1.13   7.80     6.5   1.99 
Denmark   2.75   4.56   13.8   1.90 
Estonia 10.76   8.60   15.2   2.29 
Finland   0.87   9.53   25.6   2.12 
France   5.18   8.16   24.0   2.89 
Germany   9.28   8.86   24.5   2.44 
Great Britain   7.00   4.56     9.4   1.08 
Greece   6.64   9.93     8.4   3.02 
Hungary   1.37   6.23     6.0   1.68 
Ireland   1.61   4.00     8.1   1.27 
Italy    0.06   7.60   10.8   1.88 
Luxembourg   3.24   2.26   11.0   3.35 
Netherlands   6.00   3.26   17.9   2.27 
Norway   2.89   3.93   18.2   2.61 
Poland   0.60 18.3      25.0   2.04 
Portugal   4.50   5.73   12.8   3.47 
Spain   4.26 10.03   12.3   3.03 
Slovenia   4.75   6.50   10.0   2.57 
Slovakia   0.97 16.46       25.0   1.88 
Sweden   5.76   5.70   22.7   2.49 
Switzerland    6.91   2.63   14.3   1.60 
Ukraine   5.45   7.00   15.0   2.30 
  
Table 4: Odds Ratios from a Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Regression Model for Ability to Live on Household Income: 
Welfare Regime Types as Predictors 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native (
00
! ) -3.28*** -3.35*** -4.29*** -2.83*** -2.78*** -2.76*** -3.00*** -2.84*** 
  Bismarckian regime (
01
! )    0.14  0.09 -0.02  0.14  0.10  0.14 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
02
! )    0.28  0.18  0.13  0.28  0.60  0.01 
  Southern regime (
03
! )    1.47*  1.16*  1.11+  1.02+  1.55*  1.27* 
  Eastern regime  (
04
! )    2.16***  2.07***  2.06***  1.82**  2.31***  2.04** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      0.03    
   Natives unemployment rate (
05
! )       0.05   
   Immigrants unemployment rate (
05
! )         0.04+  
   Employment Protection Legislation (
05
! )        -0.15 
Immigrant (
10
! )  -2.67*** -3.33*** -1.89*** -1.85*** -1.86***  -2.04*** -1.90*** 
  Bismarckian regime (
11
! )    0.37   0.31  0.21  0.35   0.32  0.35 
  Anglo-Saxon regime (
12
! )   -0.32  -0.21 -0.25 -0.13   0.13 -0.24 
  Southern regime (
13
! )    0.98+   0.87  0.83  0.75   1.21*  0.88 
  Eastern regime (
14
! )    1.43**   1.31**  1.30*  1.09*   1.50**  1.28* 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      0.00    
   Natives unemployment rate (
05
! )       0.04   
   Immigrants unemployment rate (
05
! )         0.03  
   Employment Protection Legislation (
05
! )         -0.03 
Level 1 controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
   Age Squared (
! 
"
30
)     -0.71***  -0.71***  -0.71***  -0.71***  -0.71*** 
   Male (
40
! )     -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )      0.36***   0.36***   0.36***   0.36***   0.36*** 
   Partnered (
60
! )    -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.53*** 
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   Rural area (
! 
"
70
)     0.03*  0.03*  0.03*  0.03*  0.03* 
   Education (
80
! )    -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
   Employed (
90
! )    -1.64*** -1.64*** -1.64*** -1.64*** -1.64*** 
   Inactive (
! 
"
100
)    -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.24*** 
Between-country variance  (
00
! ) 1.22*** 1.22*** 0.52***  0.54***  0.56***  0.53***  0.51***  0.57*** 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )  0.20*** 0.09***  0.10***  0.10***  0.09***  0.10***  0.10*** 
Total variance explained (%)       57%    56%    54%    56%    58%    53% 
Threshold (
! 
"2) 1.83 1.84 1.84  1.97 1.97  1.97  1.97  1.97 
Threshold (
! 
"3) 4.28 4.30 4.30  4.63 4.63  4.63  4.63  4.63 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. ‡Outcome variable= ability to live on present income coded (1) very difficult on present income, (2) difficult 
on present income (3) coping on present income (4) living comfortably on present income.   
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 5: Difference between Native-born and Foreign-bon individuals on their to Ability to Live on Household Income across  
Welfare Regimes.  
 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. ‡Outcome variable= ability to live on present income coded (1) very difficult on present income, (2) difficult 
on present income (3) coping on present income (4) living comfortably on present income.   
 
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! ) -4.29 -2.83 -2.78 -2.76 -3.00 -2.84 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! ) -4.15 -2.73 -2.80 -2.61 -2.88 -2.69 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! ) -4.00 -2.64 -2.64 -2.47 -2.39 -2.82 
  Southern regime (
04
! ) -2.81 -1.66 -1.65 -1.73 -1.44 -1.56 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! ) -2.13 -0.75 -0.71 -0.93 -0.68 -0.79 
Foreign-born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! )  0.96***  0.93***  0.93***  0.92***  0.96***  0.93*** 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! )  1.20***  1.15***  1.17***  1.13***  1.17***  1.15*** 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! )  0.35+  0.53**  0.54**  0.50**  0.49**  0.67** 
  Southern regime (
04
! )  0.46**  0.64**  0.64**  0.65**  0.61*  0.54* 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! )  0.23+  0.17  0.17  0.19  0.15  0.17 
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Table 6: Odds Ratios from a Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Regression Model for Ability to Live on Household Income: 
Welfare Effort as Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! )  -3.37*** -3.43***  -3.44***  -2.08*** -2.08***  -2.08***  -2.08*** -2.08*** 
Welfare effort  (
01
! )    -0.12**  -0.10** -0.10**  -0.07**  -0.12*** -0.10** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.02    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )        0.13***   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )         0.02  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -0.03 
Immigrant (
10
! )     -2.75***  -2.75***  -1.38*** -1.40***  -1.38***   -1.37*** -1.40*** 
Welfare effort  (
11
! )    -0.07**  -0.07** -0.07**  -0.05**   -0.09*** -0.07*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )        0.01    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )        0.08**   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )          0.03  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )          0.16 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
   Age Squared (
! 
"
30
)     -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07*** 
   Male (
! 
"
40
)     -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )      0.37***   0.37***   0.37***   0.37***   0.37*** 
   Partnered(
60
! )     -0.54***  -0.54***  -0.54***  -0.54***  -0.54*** 
   Rural area(
70
! )      0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02 
   Education(
80
! )     -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12*** 
   Employed(
! 
"
90
)     -1.63***  -1.63***  -1.63***  -1.63***  -1.63*** 
   Inactive (
! 
"
100
)     -1.24***  -1.24***  -1.24***  -1.24***  -1.24*** 
Between-country variance  (
00
! ) 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.63***  0.58***  0.61***  0.37***  0.58***  0.61*** 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )  0.22*** 0.20***  0.17***  0.17***  0.15***  0.17***  0.17*** 
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Total variance explained (%)      32%   37%   34%   60%   38%   34% 
Threshold (
! 
"2) 1.83 1.80 1.80  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94 
Threshold (
! 
"3) 4.24 4.27 4.27  4.59  4.59  4.59  4.59  4.59 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. ‡Outcome variable= ability to live on present income coded (1) very difficult on present income, (2) difficult 
on present income (3) coping on present income (4) living comfortably on present income.   
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  154 
Table 7: Difference between Native-born and Foreign-bon individuals on their to Ability to Live on Household Income, 
Generalized Trust, Trust in Institutions and Frequency of Informal Social Contacts across Welfare Regimes: Welfare Effort 
and Welfare Scope as Predictors.  
 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
 
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! )        
   Ability to live on household income -3.44 -2.08 -2.08 -2.08 -2.08 -2.08 
   Generalized trust 15.37 14.16 14.16 14.16 14.15 14.14 
   Trust in institutions 16.21 14.56 14.57 14.57 14.56 14.56 
   Frequency of informal social contacts 10.06 10.86 10.85 10.86 10.86 10.86 
Foreign-born        
   Ability to live on household income -2.75*** -1.38*** -1.40*** -1.38*** -1.37*** -1.40*** 
   Generalized trust 15.08 13.94 14.03 13.93 13.93 13.96 
   Trust in institutions 16.74* 15.17* 15.17* 15.17* 15.16* 15.14* 
   Frequency of informal social contacts   9.79 10.52 10.54 10.45 10.52 10.52 
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Table 8: Odds Ratios from a Hierarchical Ordered Logistic Regression Model for Ability to Live on Household Income: 
Welfare Scope as Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! )  -3.37*** -3.43***  -3.44***  -2.08*** -2.08*** -2.08***  -2.08*** -2.08*** 
Means-tested benefits  (
01
! )    -0.30+  -0.24 -0.24 -0.21+  -0.25 -0.24 
Non-means-tested benefits ( )    -0.13**  -0.12** -0.12** -0.08**  -0.13** -0.12** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.01    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )        0.13***   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )          0.02  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -0.07 
Immigrant (
10
! )     -2.75***  -2.76***  -1.38*** -1.41***  -1.38***   -1.37*** -1.39*** 
Means-tested benefits (
11
! )    -0.26*  -0.19+ -0.22*  -0.17*   -0.19+ -0.16 
Non-means-tested benefits ()    -0.08**  -0.07** -0.07**  -0.05*   -0.09** -0.07** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )        0.02    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )        0.09**   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )          0.03*  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )          0.13 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
   Age Squared (
! 
"
30
)     -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07***  -0.07*** 
   Male (
! 
"
40
)     -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.08*** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )      0.37***   0.37***   0.37***   0.37***   0.37*** 
   Partnered(
60
! )     -0.54***  -0.54***  -0.54***  -0.54***  -0.54*** 
   Rural area(
70
! )      0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02   0.02 
   Education(
80
! )     -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12***  -0.12*** 
   Employed(
! 
"
90
)     -1.63***  -1.63***  -1.63***  -1.63***  -1.63*** 
   Inactive (
! 
"
100
)    -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.24*** -1.24*** 
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Between-country variance  (
00
! ) 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.70***  0.64***  0.67***  0.40***  0.65***  0.67*** 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )  0.22*** 0.20***  0.17***  0.18***  0.15***  0.18***  0.18*** 
Total variance explained (%)      24%   31%   28%   57%   30%   28% 
Threshold (
! 
"2) 1.83 1.80 1.80  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.94 
Threshold (
! 
"3) 4.24 4.27 4.27  4.59  4.59  4.59  4.59  4.59 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. ‡Outcome variable= ability to live on present income coded (1) very difficult on present income, (2) difficult 
on present income (3) coping on present income (4) living comfortably on present income.   
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 9:  Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Generalized Trust: Welfare Regime Types as Predictors. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 15.22*** 15.25*** 19.38*** 17.78*** 17.89*** 17.58*** 17.93*** 17.74*** 
  Bismarckian regime  (
01
! )   -3.36*** -2.97*** -3.24*** -2.99*** -2.72*** -2.86*** 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
02
! )   -2.51* -1.93* -2.00* -1.90* -2.29* -3.08** 
  Southern regime (
03
! )   -6.82*** -6.35*** -6.45*** -6.01*** -7.02*** -5.69*** 
  Eastern regime  (
04
! )   -6.15*** -5.55*** -5.61*** -5.03*** -5.84*** -5.61*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      0.11    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )      -0.14*   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.07+  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -0.97+ 
Immigrant (
10
! )  14.95*** 17.76** 16.40** 16.36** 16.24** 16.57** 16.35** 
  Bismarckian regime (
11
! )   -2.42**  -2.03** -1.89* -2.04** -1.69** -1.85** 
  Anglo-Saxon regime (
12
! )   -0.49  -0.47 -0.35 -0.44 -0.97 -1.68+ 
  Southern regime  (
13
! )   -4.46***  -4.19*** -4.08*** -3.90*** -4.99*** -3.39*** 
  Eastern regime (
14
! )   -4.51***  -4.22*** -4.05*** -3.83*** -4.61*** -4.22*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
15
! )      -0.06    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
15
! )       -0.11   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
15
! )        -0.09**  
   Employment Protection index (
15
! )        -1.13* 
Individual-leve1 controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
   Age squared (
! 
"
30
)     0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.11*** 
   Male (
40
! )    -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   Partnered(
60
! )     0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.23***  0.23*** 
   Rural area (
70
! )     0.31***  0.31***  0.31***  0.31***  0.31*** 
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   Education(
80
! )     0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18*** 
   Employed(
90
! )     1.18***  1.18***  1.18***  1.18***  1.18*** 
   Inactive (
100
! )     1.08***  1.08***  1.08***  1.08***  1.08*** 
Between-country variance (
00
! )   7.10***   7.10***   1.43***  1.33***  1.34***  1.10***  1.23***  1.34*** 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )    1.14***   0.66***  0.56***  0.41***  0.58***  0.55***  0.61*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r ) 27.37 27.36 27.34 26.81 26.81 26.81 26.81 26.81 
Between-country variance explained (%)   79.80 81.21 81.07 84.45 82.58 81.01 
Within-country variance explained (%)         0.1   2.04   2.04   2.04   2.04   2.04 
Total variance explained (%)         17%   18%   18%   19%   18%   18% 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= generalized trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust. 
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 10: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Trust in Institutions: Welfare Regime Types as 
Predictors 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 16.13*** 16.14*** 19.94*** 18.23*** 18.37*** 18.03*** 18.64*** 18.16*** 
  Bismarckian regime  (
01
! )   -3.09** -3.07** -3.35** -3.20** -3.06*** -2.82*** 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
02
! )   -4.01** -4.02** -4.08** -4.07** -5.24*** -5.54*** 
  Southern regime (
03
! )   -4.26*** -3.82** -3.95** -3.53** -4.84*** -2.98*** 
  Eastern regime  (
04
! )   -6.72*** -6.68*** -6.78*** -6.08*** -7.26*** -6.75*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      0.10    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )      -0.15+   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.11**  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -1.27* 
Immigrant (
10
! )   16.67*** 19.56*** 17.95*** 18.05*** 17.71*** 18.41*** 17.90*** 
  Bismarckian regime (
11
! )   -1.91+  -1.74+ -1.90+ -1.87+ -1.72+ -1.56 
  Anglo-Saxon regime (
12
! )   -1.61  -1.93 -1.94 -1.99 -3.26* -2.93+ 
  Southern regime  (
13
! )   -2.57*  -2.27+ -2.36+ -1.96+ -3.44** -1.77 
  Eastern regime (
14
! )   -6.57***  -6.61*** -6.64*** -5.93*** -7.28*** -6.73*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
15
! )       0.05    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
15
! )        -0.18   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
15
! )         -0.12**  
   Employment Protection index (
15
! )         -0.81 
Individual-leve1 controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
   Age squared (
! 
"
30
)     0.12***  0.12***  0.12***  0.12***  0.12*** 
   Male (
40
! )     0.11**  0.11**  0.11**  0.11**  0.11** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )     0.11**  0.11**  0.11**  0.11**  0.11** 
   Partnered(
60
! )     0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30*** 
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   Rural area (
70
! )     0.20***  0.20***  0.20***  0.20***  0.20*** 
   Education(
80
! )     0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16***  0.16*** 
   Employed(
90
! )     1.31***  1.31***  1.31***  1.31***  1.31*** 
   Inactive (
100
! )     1.34***  1.34***  1.34***  1.34***  1.34*** 
Between-country variance (
00
! )   8.25***   8.25***   2.26***  2.11***  2.18***  2.13***  1.77***  1.94*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r ) 31.84 31.82 31.78 31.28 31.28 31.28 31.28 31.28 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )    1.21***   0.74***  0.73***  0.74***  0.78***  0.77***  0.66*** 
Between-country variance explained (%)      72.60 74.42 73.57 74.18 78.54 76.48 
Within-country variance explained (%)        0.18   1.75   1.75   1.75   1.75   1.75 
Total variance explained (%)      15% 17% 16% 17% 17% 17% 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= institutional trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust.  
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 11: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Frequency of Informal Social Contacts: Welfare Regime 
Types as Predictors. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 10.00*** 10.02*** 12.68*** 13.61*** 13.63*** 13.38*** 13.70*** 13.58*** 
  Bismarckian regime  (
01
! )   -2.82* -2.67* -2.73* -2.69* -2.65* -2.85** 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
02
! )   -2.88+ -2.93* -2.95* -3.09* -3.18* -1.09 
  Southern regime (
03
! )   -1.62 -1.97+ -1.99 -1.53 -2.15 -2.89* 
  Eastern regime  (
04
! )   -4.75*** -5.29*** -5.27*** -4.71** -5.43*** -4.99*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      0.02    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )      -0.13   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.02  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )         1.64* 
Immigrant (
10
! )    9.84*** 13.42*** 13.35*** 13.37*** 13.06*** 13.70*** 13.34*** 
  Bismarckian regime (
11
! )   -3.38**  -2.54* -2.59* -2.52* -2.44** -2.73** 
  Anglo-Saxon regime (
12
! )   -4.46**  -3.67* -3.68* -3.90** -4.37** -1.71 
  Southern regime  (
13
! )   -3.57**  -3.94** -3.96** -3.36** -4.34** -5.03*** 
  Eastern regime (
14
! )   -5.96***  -4.20** -4.15** -3.57** -4.56** -3.95** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
15
! )       0.01    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
15
! )       -0.15   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
15
! )        -0.06  
   Employment Protection index (
15
! )         1.79* 
Individual-leve1 controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
   Age squared (
! 
"
30
)     0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.26*** 
   Male (
40
! )     0.66***  0.66***  0.66***  0.66***  0.66*** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )    -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.55*** 
   Partnered(
60
! )    -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** 
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   Rural area (
70
! )     0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
   Education(
80
! )    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   Employed(
90
! )    -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 -0.20 
   Inactive (
100
! )     0.95***  0.95***  0.95***  0.95***  0.95*** 
Between-country variance (
00
! )   8.48***   8.47***   6.89***  6.76***  7.13***  6.93***  6.93***  6.33*** 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )    1.05***   1.22***  0.80***  0.86***  0.79***  0.71***  0.86*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r ) 93.13 93.13 93.12 82.77 82.77 82.77 82.77 82.77 
Between-country variance explained (%)   18.75 20.28 15.91 18.27 18.27 25.35 
Within-country variance explained (%)       0.01 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 11.12 
Total variance explained (%)       2% 12% 11% 12% 12% 12% 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= Frequency of informal social contacts coded as  (0)= never; (0.5)=less than once a month; 
(1)=once a month,  (3)=several times a month, (4)=once a week, (12)=several times a week,  (30)= every day.  
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 12: Difference between Native-born and Foreign-bon individuals in Generalized Trust across Welfare Regimes. 
 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= generalized trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust. 
 
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! ) 19.38 17.78 17.89 17.58 17.93 17.74 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! ) 16.01 14.79 14.65 14.57 15.21 14.87 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! ) 16.88 15.84 15.89 15.68 15.64 14.66 
  Southern regime (
04
! ) 12.57 11.43 11.44 11.57 10.92 12.05 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! ) 13.23 12.21 12.29 12.54 12.08 12.12 
Foreign-born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! ) -1.62** -1.38** -1.52** -1.33** -1.36** -1.39** 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! ) -0.68+ -0.43 -0.18 -0.38 -0.34 -0.38 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! )  0.38  0.09  0.12  0.12 -0.04 -0.00 
  Southern regime (
04
! )  0.72  0.78+  0.83*  0.76+  0.65  0.90 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! )  0.01 -0.04  0.02 -0.13 -0.13 -0.00 
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Table 13: Difference between Native-born and Foreign-bon individuals in Trust in Institutions across Welfare Regimes. 
 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= institutional trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust.  
 
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! ) 19.94 18.23 18.37 18.03 18.64 18.16 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! ) 16.85 15.16 15.02 14.82 15.58 15.33 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! ) 15.93 14.21 14.30 13.97 13.40 12.62 
  Southern regime (
04
! ) 15.69 14.41 14.42 14.50 12.62 15.18 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! ) 13.22 11.54 11.58 11.94 11.38 11.40 
Foreign--born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! ) -0.38 -0.28 -0.32 -0.31 -0.23 -0.25 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! )  0.80*  1.05**  1.21**  1.01*  1.11**   1.01* 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! )  2.02**  1.81*  1.81*  1.75*  1.74*  2.35* 
  Southern regime (
04
! )  1.30*  1.27*  1.27**  1.25*  1.16*   0.95 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! ) -0.23 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.25  -0.23 
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Table 14: Difference between Native-born and Foreign-bon individuals in Frequency of Socialization across Welfare  
Regimes. 
 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= Frequency of informal social contacts coded as  (0)= never; (0.5)=less than once a month; 
(1)=once a month,  (3)=several times a month, (4)=once a week, (12)=several times a week,  (30)= every day.  
 
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! ) 12.68 13.61 13.63 13.38 13.70 13.58 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! )   9.85 10.93 10.89 10.69 11.05 10.72 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! )   9.79 10.67 10.66 10.29 10.05 12.48 
  Southern regime (
04
! ) 11.25 11.64 11.63 11.83 11.54 10.66 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! )   7.95   9.14   8.36   8.68   8.25   9.14 
Foreign-born (
00
! )       
  Scandinavian regime (
01
! )   0.73 -0.24 -0.25 -0.34 -0.14 -0.27 
  Bismarckian regime  (
02
! )   0.19 -0.12 -0.11 -0.15  0.03 -0.11 
  Anglo-Saxon regime  (
03
! )   0.83 -1.00 -0.98 -1.31+ -1.35+ -0.86 
  Southern regime (
04
! )   1.21* -2.23*** -2.23***  -2.14*** -2.36*** -2.35** 
  Eastern regime  (
05
! )  -0.50  0.83*  0.85+  0.81+  0.71+  0.78+ 
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Table 15: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Generalized Trust: Welfare Effort as Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 15.34*** 15.37*** 15.37*** 14.16*** 14.16*** 14.16*** 14.15*** 14.14*** 
Welfare effort  (
01
! )     0.24**   0.22**   0.22*   0.17*   0.20*   0.23** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.01    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.21*   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )        0.03  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -1.74** 
Immigrant (
10
! )   15.06*** 15.08*** 13.94*** 14.03*** 13.93*** 13.93*** 13.96*** 
Welfare effort  (
11
! )     0.13*  0.13**  0.13**  0.09+  0.13**  0.13*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )      -0.15    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )      -0.17*   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )       -0.00  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )        -1.62** 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )     0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
   Age Squared (
! 
"
30
)     0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.11*** 
   Male (
30
! )    -0.27** -0.27** -0.27** -0.27** -0.27** 
   Residential Parent (
40
! )    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   Partnered(
50
! )     0.25***  0.25***  0.25***  0.25***  0.25*** 
   Rural area (
60
! )     0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30*** 
   Education(
70
! )     0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18*** 
   Employed(
80
! )     1.19***  1.19***  1.19***  1.19***  1.19*** 
   Inactive (
100
! )     1.10***  1.10***  1.10***  1.10***  1.10*** 
Between-country variance  (
00
! )  7.08*** 7.08*** 5.66***  5.00***  5.24***  3.97***  5.27***  4.81*** 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )  1.20*** 0.95***  0.88***  0.71***  0.79***  0.79***  0.90*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r )   26.95 26.93 26.38  26.38  26.38 26.38 26.38 26.38 
  167 
Between-country variance explained (%)   20.05%  29.37%  25.98 % 43.92 % 25.56% 32.06% 
Within-country variance explained (%)       0.02%    0.02%    0.02%   0.02%   0.02%   0.02% 
Total variance explained (%)       6%    8%    7%   11%   7%   8% 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= generalized trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust. 
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 16: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Generalized Trust: Welfare Scope as Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 15.34*** 15.37*** 15.37*** 14.95*** 14.95*** 14.16*** 14.15*** 14.14*** 
Means-tested benefits  (
01
! )   -0.47 -0.35 -0.34  -0.02  -0.40  -0.37** 
Non-means-tested benefits (
! 
"
02
)     0.26**  0.22**  0.23*   0.16+   0.20*   0.25** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.01    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.22*   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )         0.04  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -1.88** 
Immigrant (
10
! )   15.06*** 15.08*** 13.94*** 14.04*** 13.92*** 13.92*** 13.96*** 
Means-tested benefits  (
11
! )     -0.01  0.01   0.01  0.29  0.00  -0.03*** 
Non-means-tested benefits (
! 
"
12
)       0.13*  0.13*   0.13*  0.07  0.13*   0.15*** 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )       -0.01    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )      -0.21**   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )        0.00  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )         -1.60** 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )     0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
   Age Squared (
! 
"
30
)     0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.11***  0.11*** 
   Male (
30
! )    -0.27** -0.27** -0.27** -0.27** -0.27** 
   Residential Parent (
40
! )    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   Partnered(
50
! )     0.25***  0.25***  0.25***  0.25***  0.25*** 
   Rural area (
60
! )     0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30***  0.30*** 
   Education(
70
! )     0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18***  0.18*** 
   Employed(
80
! )     1.19***  1.19***  1.19***  1.19***  1.19*** 
   Inactive (
100
! )     1.10***  1.10***  1.10***  1.10***  1.10*** 
Between-country variance  (
00
! )  7.08*** 7.08*** 6.48***  5.75***  6.04***  4.47***  6.07***  5.60*** 
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Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )  1.20*** 1.15***  0.89***  0.76***  0.91***  0.93***  0.99*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r )   26.95 26.93 26.92  26.38  26.38 26.38 26.38 26.38 
Between-country variance explained (%)     8.47%  18.78%  14.68% 36.86% 14.26% 20.90% 
Within-country variance explained (%)       0.01%    0.02%    0.02%   0.02%   0.02%   0.02% 
Total variance explained (%)       2%    6%    5%   9%   5%   6% 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= generalized trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust. 
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 17: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Trust in Institutions: Welfare Effort as Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 16.28*** 16.27*** 16.21*** 14.56*** 14.57*** 14.57*** 14.56*** 14.56*** 
 Welfare effort  (
01
! )     0.23**   0.21**   0.21*   0.20*   0.22**   0.21** 
 Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.00    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.05   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )        -0.01  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -0.14 
Immigrant (
10
! )   16.82*** 16.74*** 15.17*** 15.17*** 15.17*** 15.16***  15.14*** 
 Welfare effort  (
11
! )     0.22***   0.21***   0.20***   0.20***   0.21***    0.20*** 
 Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )      -0.00    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )      -0.02   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )        -0.00  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )         0.18 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )     0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
   Age Squared     0.12***  0.12***  0.12***  0.12***  0.12*** 
   Male (
30
! )     0.14*  0.14*  0.14*  0.14*  0.14* 
   Residential Parent (
40
! )     0.11+  0.11+  0.11+  0.11+  0.11+ 
   Partnered(
50
! )     0.33***  0.33***  0.33***  0.33***  0.33*** 
   Rural area (
60
! )     0.18*  0.18*  0.18*  0.18*  0.18* 
   Education(
70
! )     0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17*** 
   Employed(
80
! )     1.32***  1.32***  1.32***  1.32***  1.32*** 
   Inactive     1.35***  1.35***  1.35***  1.35***  1.35*** 
Between-country variance  (
00
! )  7.08*** 7.06*** 5.12***  4.82***  5.03***  4.17***  4.91***  5.06*** 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )    1.17***   1.24***    1.14***  1.18***   1.24***   1.23***   1.23*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r )   31.31 31.29 31.29  30.75 30.75 30.75 30.75 30.75 
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Between-country variance explained (%)    27.68%  31.92% 28.95% 41.10% 30.64% 28.53% 
Within-country variance explained (%)     0.06%    1.80%   1.80%   1.80%   1.80%   1.80% 
Total variance explained (%)     5%    7%   7%   9 %   7 %   7 % 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= institutional trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust.  
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 18: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Trust in Institutions: Welfare Scope as Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 16.28*** 16.27*** 16.21*** 14.57*** 14.56*** 14.57*** 14.56*** 14.56*** 
 Means-tested benefits  (
01
! )    -0.53+  -0.56+  -0.56  -0.54+  -0.54  -0.63+ 
 Non-means-tested benefits (
! 
"
02
)     0.27**   0.24**   0.24**   0.24**   0.26**   0.25** 
 Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.00    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.02   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )        -0.02  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )        -0.51 
Immigrant (
10
! )   16.82*** 16.74*** 15.16*** 15.17*** 15.16*** 15.15***  15.13*** 
 Means-tested benefits  (
01
! )    -0.19  -0.19  -0.28  -0.27  -0.27  -0.28 
 Non-means-tested benefits (
! 
"
02
)     0.25***   0.25***   0.24***   0.24***   0.26***   0.25*** 
 Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )      -0.00    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )      -0.01   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )        -0.01  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )         -0.02 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )     0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
   Age Squared     0.12***  0.12***  0.12***  0.12***  0.12*** 
   Male (
30
! )     0.14*  0.14*  0.14*  0.14*  0.14* 
   Residential Parent (
40
! )     0.11+  0.11+  0.11+  0.11+  0.11+ 
   Partnered(
50
! )     0.33***  0.33***  0.33***  0.33***  0.33*** 
   Rural area(
60
! )     0.18*  0.18*  0.18*  0.18*  0.18* 
   Education(
70
! )     0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17***  0.17*** 
   Employed(
80
! )     1.32***  1.32***  1.32***  1.32***  1.32*** 
   Inactive     1.35***  1.35***  1.35***  1.35***  1.35*** 
Between-country variance  (
00
! )  7.08*** 7.06*** 5.55***  5.21***  5.43***  4.39***  5.30***  5.46*** 
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Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )  1.17*** 1.00***  0.94***  0.99***  0.99***  1.01***  0.94*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r )   31.31 31.29 31.27  30.73 30.73 30.73 30.73 30.75 
Between-country variance explained (%)    21.61%  26.41% 23.30% 37.99% 25.14% 22.88% 
Within-country variance explained (%)     0.01%    1.85%   1.85%   1.85%   1.85%   1.85% 
Total variance explained (%)     4%    6%   6%   8%   6%   6% 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= institutional trust coded (0) = no trust at all to (10) = complete trust.  
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 19: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Frequency of Informal Social Contacts: Welfare Effort 
as Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.06*** 10.86*** 10.86*** 10.85*** 10.86*** 10.86*** 
Welfare effort  (
01
! )     0.08   0.14+   0.14*   0.08   0.14   0.12 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.04    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.19+   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )        -0.00  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )         1.41* 
Immigrant (
10
! )    9.93***    9.79***  10.52*** 10.54*** 10.45*** 10.52***  10.52*** 
Welfare effort  (
11
! )      0.19*   0.12*  0.13*   0.06   0.12+   0.11+ 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )      -0.06    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )      -0.23**   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )        -0.00  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )         1.03+ 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
   Age Squared (
30
! )     0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.26*** 
   Male (
40
! )     0.62***  0.62***  0.62***  0.62***  0.62*** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )    -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** 
   Partnered (
60
! )    -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** 
   Rural (
70
! )     0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
   Education (
80
! )    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   Employed (
! 
"
90
)    -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
   Inactive (
! 
"
100
)     0.93***  0.93***  0.93***  0.93***  0.93*** 
Between-country variance  (
00
! )    8.71***   8.71***   8.57***  8.67***  8.67***  8.58***  8.70***  7.61*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r )   93.20 93.20 93.20 82.81 82.81 82.81 82.81 82.81 
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Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )    1.12***   1.27***  1.55***   1.65***   1.54***   1.62***   1.59*** 
Between-country variance explained (%)       1.60%   0.4%   0.4%   1.49%   0.01% 12.62% 
Within-country variance explained (%)       0.00%  11%   11%   11%   11%   11% 
Total variance explained (%)     0.13%  10 %   10 %   10 %   10 %   11 % 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= Frequency of informal social contacts coded as  (0)= never; (0.5)=less than once a month; 
(1)=once a month,  (3)=several times a month, (4)=once a week, (12)=several times a week,  (30)= every day.  
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
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Table 20: Estimates from a Hierarchical Linear Regression Model for Frequency of Social Contacts: Welfare Scope as 
Predictor. 
 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Native-born (
00
! ) 10.07*** 10.08*** 10.06*** 10.86*** 10.86*** 10.86*** 10.87*** 10.87*** 
Means-tested benefits  (
01
! )     0.21   0.24   0.27   0.12   0.24   0.41 
Non-means-tested benefits (
! 
"
02
)     0.07   0.13   0.13+   0.07   0.12   0.10 
Country-level controls:          
   Percentage of immigrants (
05
! )      -0.04    
   Native-born unemployment rate (
05
! )       -0.20+   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
05
! )         0.00  
   Employment Protection index (
05
! )         1.51* 
Immigrant (
10
! )    9.93***    9.82***  10.55*** 10.56*** 10.48*** 10.55***  10.56*** 
Means-tested benefits (
11
! )      0.13  -0.09  -0.06  -0.19  -0.09   0.02 
Non-means-tested benefits (
! 
"
02
)      0.19*   0.11   0.12+   0.05   0.11   0.09 
Country-level controls:         
   Percentage of immigrants (
13
! )       -0.04    
   Country unemployment rate (
13
! )      -0.24**   
   Immigrant unemployment rate (
13
! )        -0.00  
   Employment Protection index (
13
! )         0.98 
Individual-level controls:         
   Age (
20
! )    -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
   Age Squared (
30
! )     0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.26*** 
   Male (
40
! )     0.62***  0.62***  0.62***  0.62***  0.62*** 
   Residential Parent (
50
! )    -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** 
   Partnered (
60
! )    -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** -2.17*** 
   Rural (
70
! )     0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
   Education (
80
! )    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   Employed (
! 
"
90
)    -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
   Inactive (
! 
"
100
)     0.93***  0.93***  0.93***  0.93***  0.93*** 
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Between-country variance  (
00
! )   8.71***   8.71***   8.70***  8.70***  8.70***  8.70***  8.70***  8.08*** 
Within-country variance (
00
r )   93.20 93.20 93.20 82.81 82.81 82.81 82.81 82.81 
Immigrant slope variance (
01
! )    1.12***   1.17***  1.47***  1.49***   1.50***   1.54***  1.48*** 
Between-country variance explained (%)       1.60%   0.1%   0.1%   0.01%   0.01%  7.23% 
Within-country variance explained (%)       0.00%  11%   11%   11%   11%   11% 
Total variance explained (%)        0%  10%   10%   10%   10%   11% 
+p<0.10 *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001‡Outcome variable= Frequency of informal social contacts coded as  (0)= never; (0.5)=less than once a month; 
(1)=once a month,  (3)=several times a month, (4)=once a week, (12)=several times a week,  (30)= every day.  
 
Model 0: One-way ANOVA with random effects. 
Model 1: Random coefficients regression model.  
Model 2: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes  
Model 3: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables. 
Model 4: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + country percentage of immigrants. 
Model 5: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + native-born unemployment rate. 
Model 6: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + foreign-born unemployment rate. 
Model 7: Intercepts and slopes as outcomes controlling for individual level variables + Employment Protection Legislation index.  
 
 
